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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of international sporting and cultural events on
national stock markets. We study market reaction to the announcements of the selected country
hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the European Football
Cup and  World and Specialized Exhibitions. We also measure the market effects of the
announcement of the nomination of the European Cultural City. First, we evaluate the abnormal
returns of winning bidders at (and around) the announcement date using an event study
methodology. We study the impact at market and industry-levels. Second, we analyze the
determinants of the variation in abnormal returns across events and industries on the basis of a
set of variables found important by previous studies and control for the prior probability of
observing the event. Third, on the basis of a simple model of partial anticipation, we reexamine
the abnormal returns observed for the winning and losing countries and perform a series of tests
to disentangle the different theoretical arguments that could account for the observed stock
market behavior. Our initial results suggest that the abnormal returns measured at the
announcement date and around the event are not consistently different from zero. Further, when
we look at particular industries, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were
more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe positive significant effects. Yet 
when we control for the prior expectations, the announcement of these mega-events is associatedwith a positive market reaction in the nominated country and a negative reaction in the losing
country. Overall we interpret our findings as supportive of rational asset pricing and partial
anticipation.
JEL Classification Codes: G31, G14, L83
Keywords: Market efficiency; event studies, mega-events 3
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the impact of international sporting and cultural events on the 
stock markets of host countries. These are mega, one-time events entailing large public 
and private investments. 
Why should we observe a market reaction to the announcement of such mega 
events and of what magnitude? Two main competing arguments predict that these 
events produce non-negative abnormal returns as of the announcement date.  
Assuming that the event was not anticipated, under the null hypothesis of 
efficient markets, positive or negative abnormal returns would reflect that investors 
anticipate that this (unexpected) news has a positive/negative valuation effect on the 
market capitalization of listed firms (Fama, 1965). Assuming managers maximize 
shareholders’ value, only positive NPV projects would be undertaken, and market prices 
would adjust upwards the event-related news. Further, anticipation of (net) economic-
wide benefits driven by event-related international exposure, public infrastructure 
improvements, and multiplier effects of the initial revenues would result in a positive 
impact for the aggregate market. Variation in abnormal returns across firms (or 
industries) would reflect the differential net benefit each firm (industry) would extract 
from the event.  
Alternatively, market reaction to winning news could reflect a national positive 
sentiment caused by pride, self-esteem or joy associated with the fact that the country 
was chosen to host and sometimes organize an international (most of the times) 
worldwide broadcasted and recognizably important event. In contrast, the first 
explanation assumes that investors are rational and predicts that, when sentiment is not 
associated with any tangible economic effects, this news will produce no effect on 
market prices. 
The market reaction on the day an event is announced may not accurately 
measure the true economic impact of the events if investors anticipate the event will 
occur (Malatesta and Thompson, 1985). The magnitude of the effects observed should  4
be of smaller magnitude and, the greater the anticipation, the lower the impact as of the 
announcement date. This is particularly true for the events we study because in most 
instances the outcome is at least partially anticipated by investors. 
Both arguments above predict that winning (losing) countries observe positive 
(negative) market returns. Rational arguments predict that the effect should be 
asymmetric for winners and losers and across events, because the perceived economic 
impact can vary widely across countries. In a different way, behavioral arguments 
maintain that, if prices are affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the objective 
probability of observing the event and of the economic impact of the investment, we 
should observe a market rise in wins and a market decline in losses. Further, the fact 
that investors extract more pain from bad news than the joy they sense when a good 
outcome is revealed, can motivate different market reactions for winning and losing 
countries, and the magnitude of the effect would therefore be greater for losers than for 
winners. When the event is not anticipated at all, i.e. event-news is a complete surprise, 
and investors are rational, the impact should be felt only on the winner’s market value. 
In reality this scenario is rather implausible: mega-events location decisions are complex 
ongoing processes that involve several rounds of negotiation and/or voting, and require 
active bidding and intense business plans preparation from the countries or cities that 
take part in the contest. Moreover in a few cases there is only one candidacy and thus 
the announcement conveys no news. 
Stock market impact is not the same thing as overall economic impact and we do not 
intend to capture or test here the economy-wide benefits attributable to such events. 
Regardless of a positive or negative overall economic impact, individual stocks (and 
industry indices) may register positive abnormal returns. The same goes for the effects 
observed in aggregate market indices: even if investors are rational, an event yielding 
negative economy-wide effects does not have necessarily to have a similar 
correspondence in the stock market. Aggregate market returns are value-weighted 
averages of its individual constituent stocks’ returns and, while the event may be 
damaging for economic growth, listed firms (and industries), that potentially extract  5
direct benefits from the organization of the event such as tourism and infrastructure-
related industries, may observe positive market returns;  if they represent an important 
share of the stock market, significant positive market returns for the aggregate index 
may occur. Alternatively, the event may be perceived as economically neutral for listed 
firms, and yet the market register positive or negative valuations due merely to market 
sentiment or investor myopia. It is difficult to predict a priori the sign and magnitude of 
market returns and relate them directly to the overall economic impact of the event. Yet 
one can outline hypotheses motivated by the competing theoretical arguments, and test 
them upon the observed zero/non-zero, positive/negative abnormal returns, 
symmetrical/asymmetrical effects for winning and losing countries and the cross-
sectional variation of returns across events. 
In any case, an important question is whether investors evaluate these mega-
events announcements as positive news to the companies more directly involved, and in 
general, to the economy of the host country. Countries and cities strongly compete to 
host international sporting and cultural events, and provide public funding, on the basis 
of the positive effects on the country’s economy brought about by these events. 
Organizers claim that there are not only immediate increases in spending (direct and 
induced) but also further future economic benefits related with the infrastructure 
investments and international exposure. There is a lot of controversy about the true 
economic success of these events and about what they stand for. Several authors suggest 
that the true impact may be substantially lower than the one estimated in ex ante models. 
In fact, ex-post studies highlight that not only are the direct benefits lower (because of 
improper measurement of benefits and costs), but also that there is lack of empirical 
evidence demonstrating that the international exposure and the publicity associated with 
the event have any impact in improving the country or region for tourism or business. 
As for the companies more directly involved, previous literature suggests that stock 
prices tend to respond favorably to announcements of major capital investments. 
We study stock market reaction to the announcement of the selected country 
hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the  6
European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. We also measure the 
market effects of the announcement of the nomination of the European Cultural City.  
First, we evaluate the abnormal returns of winning bidders on (and around) the 
announcement date using an event study methodology. We study the impact at market 
and industry-levels. Second, we analyze the determinants of the variation in abnormal 
returns across events and industries on the basis of a set of variables found important by 
previous studies and control for the prior probability of observing the event. Third, on 
the basis of a simple model of partial anticipation, we reexamine the abnormal returns 
observed for winning and losing countries and perform a series of tests to disentangle 
the different theoretical arguments that could account for the observed stock market 
behavior. 
Using a cross-section of 81 winning countries, we find that the abnormal returns 
measured at the announcement date are not consistently different from zero. We also 
document stock market reaction over several other event-windows and again results are 
inconclusive.  Further, the CARs for losers are not statistically significant. When we 
look at particular industries, we find no evidence supporting that industries, that a priori 
were more likely to extract direct benefits from the event, observe stronger effects. 
Overall, non parametric tests seem to be more powerful but results are mixed. The 
results of the cross-sectional analysis confirm some of relations we predict. In particular, 
we document that abnormal returns are lower (in absolute terms) for winners and losers 
when the outcome is predictable. Overall we interpret our findings as supportive of 
rational asset pricing and partial anticipation. The results suggest further that non-trivial 
benefits exist but these are specific to particular events and countries. Thus, no general 
statement can be made regarding the economic merit of hosting mega-events. 
This study is related with several strands of the finance and economic literature. 
We focus on the literature of information and market efficiency. Another strand of 
literature directly related to this paper is the impact of sentiment on asset prices that we 
indirectly address. Our results are also of interest to other empirical economic research  7
areas such as economic impact studies of large capital investments and public 
investment in infrastructures, and sports, recreation and tourism studies. 
The main contribution of our paper is to perform rigorous study of market 
reaction to the announcement of mega-events. Previous studies focus on one particular 
event and consequently do not have the opportunity to explore the cross-sectional 
variation in abnormal returns. Because we analyze a large number of events, we improve 
statistical significance and are able to explore the determinants of cross-sectional 
variation across events. In addition we study different types of events that can be 
grouped in two major classes, sporting and cultural events. On top of that, unlike most 
of the previous studies, we control for partial anticipation and evaluate the effects for 
winning and loosing countries. Our study generalizes previous results, investigates the 
determinants of the observed market impact and controls for the ex-ante probability of 
a country being a successful bidder. 
While we do not address directly the overall economic benefits of these events, 
it is possible to draw some policy implications regarding the merit of (funding) these 
events. Given the limitations of traditional economic impact ex ante studies (and because 
the implementation of more comprehensive and rigorous techniques may be, in most 
cases, impracticable), event-studies looking at the market reaction to nominations may 
be a useful tool to indirectly assess the benefits of the organization of these events. Yet, 
the results of the event-study analysis have be read very carefully given that the 
observed abnormal returns may be contaminated by investor sentiment. 
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
related literature. Section 3 presents the testable hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data 
and methodology. In Section 5 we present and discuss our main findings. Section 6 
concludes.  8
2. Background and Previous Findings  
 
2.1. Overall economic impact of mega-events 
 
Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr (2005) refer mega-events as one-time or recurring events of 
limited duration. Mega-event projects entail large construction projects (infrastructural, 
productive or not) and operational costs.
1,  2 Economic impact studies (or economic 
impact assessments), most of the times sponsored by promoters, claim these mega 
projects are very positive NPV projects and there seems to be a lot of interest in hosting 
these events.
3 Yet several studies suggest that not only are the input estimates optimistic 
but the typical methodology to assess ex-ante event-related economic returns, input-
output models, fail to correctly account for the revenues that are attributable to the 
event.
4, 
5 To properly assess how much growth is attributable to the event, one has to a) 
                                                      
1 For example, Germany spent over 1,4 billion euros building or rehabilitating 12 stadiums for the 2006 Soccer World 
Cup of which 35% were funded by taxes (cited by Matheson, 2006). For the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games, 
“due for completion are: a dozen Olympic sports centres; a new cross-city underground railway; a host of office 
towers; a massive airport terminal; and, after some delay and much criticism, a colossal French-designed egg-shaped 
theatre in the city centre”, The Economist, March 1, 2007. 
2 For example, Greece spent over 1 billion euros in the 2004 Olympic Summer Games on security (cited by 
Matheson, 2006). 
3 Matheson (2006) refers that a typical impact study usually involves estimates of the direct and induced impact: “the 
number of visitors an event is expected to draw, the number of days each spectator is expected to stay, and the 
amount each visitor will spend each day (…) subjected to a multiplier, usually around two (…). The total impact is 
double the size of the initial spending”.   
4 Dwyer, Forsyth and Spurr (2005) propose a more comprehensive computable generating equilibrium model (CGE) 
to assess the economic impact of such events. 
5 “Officials estimate that the Olympics have been contributing more than two percentage points to Beijing's annual 
growth since 2003. After the games, they insist, the city's new infrastructure and additional glamour (including the 
egg-shaped theatre, which hopes to attract international stars) will help keep the economy rolling. The flow of 
investment will be sustained, they say, by further infrastructure development, and by the pent-up demand for 
property, which will be supported by a continuing large influx of migrants from the countryside.”, The Economist, 
March 1, 2007.  9
control for “substitution” and “crowding-out” effects
6 - even when demand is mostly 
non-resident or even foreign -; b) incorporate multipliers that reflect eventual “leakages 
to other countries”;
7 and c) account for the impact in taxation or government 
borrowing.
8 More refined models propose using a series of relevant variables, proxy 
factors for local growth determinants, to project the level of economic activity in the 
absence of the event. Comparing this estimate with the actual level of activity will tell us 
ex post what the effective contribution of the event was. In other words, deviations from 
average national (or local) growth or historical growth, that are not explained by 
deviations in costs of production or demand side variables, should be attributed to the 
event. 
There is some controversy regarding the economy-wide impact of mega-events 
in the host countries. The impact is measured frequently by changes in personal income, 
per capita personal income, employment and taxable sales or sale taxes collections. 
Academic studies that analyze the ex post effects of these mega-events confirm that ex 
ante estimates are overly optimistic. For example, Baade and Matheson (2004) present an 
ex post analysis of the 1994 World Cup in the U.S. and find that several cities did in fact 
                                                      
6 Ex-ante effects often ignore “substitution” and “crowding-out” effects. For example, local residents that are willing 
to join the event activities may not spend as much in other leisure activities and/or cut leisure travel to other cities in 
the country. On the other hand, due to the fixed number of hotel rooms and high prices or simply to avoid the event 
crowd, regular tourists and business travelers may prefer to go elsewhere and these lost visitors may have more 
attractive spending patterns. 
7 To estimate the output and jobs generated by the additional demand brought about by the event it is necessary to 
take in consideration whether inputs are variable or fixed. There could be capacity constraints in factors such as labor. 
For example, in many of these events, infrastructure building requires using resources that were required by other 
activities or hiring foreign workers whose subsequent spending patterns may be atypical. The benefits may not go all 
to the host country but to foreign neighbor countries or multinationals and there could be damages to other 
productive sectors in the economy. For example, all the 16 the official partners for the 2006 FIFA World Cup in 
Germany were multinationals and only two were German. Yet all the official suppliers were German companies.  
8 Public funding is often required for the event infrastructures. This could imply that other potential more productive 
investments are not funded (or postponed) or taxes have to rise (Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2000). Those public 
expenditures may or not have positive impact on the economy. Sporting events specialized infrastructures such as 
stadiums or swimming pools have a limited use and potentially benefit only a small part of the tax payers that paid for 
it. More general construction projects, for example, related with the World Expositions, such as cities core 
redevelopment and infrastructure building may benefit more directly the country or local community. Similarly, the 
benefits from investing in cultural or lifestyle amenities such as theatres and first-rate architecture museums, or urban 
parks, biking and foot trails, can attract highly educated and creative young people that are essential to economic 
growth.   10
experience significant losses in contrast with the gains estimated by the tournament 
promoters.
9 The most recent and sophisticated ex post studies, seem to suggest no 
consistent positive statistically significant net economic benefits (Matheson, 2006).
10 In 
any case, several authors notice that it is difficult to isolate the impact of the event and 
given that it is likely to be small relative to the overall economy, one may not be able 
reject the null of no economic benefits even if true benefits occur. 
 
2.2. Market impact of investment decisions 
 
The extensive event study literature focusing on announcement effects provides 
evidence that, on average, stock price reaction is consistent with market efficiency: 
prices rapidly and fully adjust to the release of new corporate information.
11 
 
2.2.1  Market reaction to major capital investments 
Capital expenditures decisions are the key financial decisions in terms of contribution to 
firm-value (Miller and Modigliani, 1958).  
Under the null hypothesis of efficient markets, the announcement effects on 
market prices should reflect the significance of any unexpected news that influence cash 
flows or discount rates (McQueen and Roley, 1993). Stock prices at time t are given by: 
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9 The authors suggest that host cities accumulated losses of US$ 5,5 to US$9,3 billions as opposed to the US$4 billion 
gain estimated by the organizers. 
10 Please refer to Matheson (2006) for an extensive survey of ex ante and ex post economic impact studies (tables 1 and  
2). 
11 For throughout reviews, see, for example,  Fama (1991) and Dimson and Mussavian (1998). Several recent studies 
present evidence contrary to market efficiency suggesting either overshooting in prices or gradual information 
dissemination. In recent years several behavioral finance models have been proposed to account for overreaction and 
underreaction but no single model has been able to fully explain and integrate these anomalies (Fama and French, 
1998).   11
  
where  
Dt+τ are the expected dividends at time t+τ; 
tRt+τ is the expected discount rate at time t+τ; and  
E[./Ωt] are the conditional expectations upon the available information set Ω at 
time t. 
     
Theoretically there are three alternative stock market reactions to 
announcements of capital expenditures plans (Woolridge and Snow (1990 and Burton, 
Lonie and Power (1999)): 
- the first hypothesis predicts a positive market reaction on the assumption that 
managers maximize shareholder wealth and undertake positive-NPV projects; hence the 
larger the economic valued added by these projects, the larger the positive impact. A 
zero or negative effect requires that these announcements are not fully anticipated and 
managers only engage in positive NPV projects.  
- the second hypothesis predicts that the impact of the announcements is null 
because investors have perfect foresight and fully anticipate future positive NPV 
projects; therefore prices incorporate its net benefits even before new capital 
expenditures are announced. The market value of a company would already reflect the 
impact of these or other investments that the firm would have to pursue to maintain its 
(anticipated) competitive advantages. Under this hypothesis, the fact that the market 
does not react to the announcements is not informative about the economic merit of 
these mega-events; 
- finally the third hypothesis predicts that the impact of the announcements of 
capital investments is negative based on the assumption that investors are myopic. As 
such, they pay too much attention to short-term earnings and penalize long-term capital 
investments. 
Previous empirical literature finds support to the first hypothesis: on average, 
stock prices seem to respond favorably to announcements of individual firms major  12
capital investments.
12 Further, the stock market reaction is greater, the level of new 
investments announced. McConnell and Muscarella (1985) show that firms’ stock 
market responses to capital expenditures announcements reflect their investment 
opportunities. Similarly, Bloose and Shieh (1997) show the market response is larger to 
announcements of firms with good investment opportunities. Yet Titman et al. (2004) 
show that increased investment expenditures may be associated with negative stock 
returns reflecting that investors underreact in fear of “empire building” decisions.
13 
 
2.2.2. Mega-events 
Mega-events announcements may produce a short-term impact on the stock prices of 
the listed companies that may benefit directly from the event such as construction and 
building materials,  tourism-related, communications and media companies.
14 More 
long-term effects could also arise due to general multiplier effects and, even more 
important, as a result of country projection.  Merton (1987) refers to changes in investor 
recognition as a source of value. Investors only invest in the assets they are aware and 
require higher returns to compensate for the shadow cost of incomplete information. 
Organizing a large event such as the Olympic games, can overrun that cost and, through 
an expansion of shareholders’ base, lead to a decrease in required returns translating into 
higher stock market valuations. The increased exposure to international media may also 
produce long term benefits through increased tourism receipts in the years after the 
event. 
                                                      
12 See, for example, Woolridge and Snow (1990), Jones, Danboldt and Hirst (2000) and Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) 
and references therein. 
13 Related with this is what is sometimes designated by Capital Myopia that refers to excessive investments pursued by 
companies that erroneously believe that there is scope for further profitable capital investments ignoring that 
competition will drive away economic rents. If investors anticipate that, a negative market reaction may be observed. 
 
14 Preto (2004) analyses the impact of the 2004 UEFA European Football Championship on listed Portuguese 
companies. The author identifies six companies that could benefit directly from the event. These are Portugal 
Telecom (telecommunications), Brisa (motorways), Impresa (media), Sonaecom (mobile operator), Ibersol (fast-food 
restaurant chain) and BPI (banks, official event sponsor).    13
Veraros, Kasimati and Dawson (2004) examine the effect of the announcement 
of the hosting city for the 2004 Olympic games on the stock exchange of Greece and 
Italy and finds a significant positive effect on the Athens Stock Exchange as well as on 
the stock prices of infrastructure-related companies.
15 Yet no (negative) effect is 
observed for the losing country stock market (Milan Stock Exchange). 
 
2.2.3. Partially-anticipated events 
Stock price changes on the announcement date may only reflect a part of the overall 
effect of an event if investors partially anticipate the event. Market reaction to 
announcements depends on investors’ perception of the likelihood of the event. 
Variation in market reaction to the announcement of a particular event may merely 
reflect the degree of anticipation. The announcement effect is most of the times smaller 
than the economic impact of the event and failure to document significant 
announcement returns may be explained by partial anticipation. Stock prices may as well 
reflect investor disappointment if investors had prior expectations on the occurrence of 
events with positive value than do not materialize (Malatesta and Thomson, 1985).   
Several studies have estimated the likelihood of observing an event based upon firms 
characteristics and found that the extent of market reaction is affected by investors’ 
prior expectations.
16  
 
2.2.4. Investor sentiment 
Several authors document that changes in investor mood are associated with changes in 
market prices. Thus, prices could move regardless of the true economic impact of these 
events or the degree of anticipation associated. Recent literature shows that events that 
have a general impact on investor sentiment, such as national team soccer results, 
                                                      
15 A similar study conducted by G. Berman, R. Brooks and S. Davidson (“The Sydney Olympic Games 
announcement and the Australian Stock market react”, Applied Economic Letters, 2000, Vol. 7, pp. 781-84), cited by 
Veraros et al. (2004) found no significance effect on the overall market, and only limited effects on stock prices of 
infrastructure development companies based in New South Wales where the Olympic Games were hosted. 
16  See, for example, Acharya (1993) or Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (2004) and references therein.  14
produce statistically and economically significant returns. For example, Edmans, Garcia 
and Norli (2007) find that a loss in World Cup leads to a next-day abnormal return of -
38 basis points, and claim that this loss effect is driven by investor sentiment. 
 
3. Development of hypotheses 
 
We evaluate the following hypotheses: 
(i) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Football Cup, the 
European Football Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a positive market reaction on the 
nominated country stock exchange.
17 
A significant positive average market reaction for the winning country is 
consistent with shareholder value maximization but could also reflect investors’ 
sentiment. A negative market reaction for the winning country may reflect either that 
investors are myopic, or that managers invest in negative NPV projects for their own 
benefits. A null impact may reflect that investors have fully anticipated the effects of the 
event.
18 
 (ii) The announcement of a mega event such as the Olympics, the World Soccer Cup, the 
European Soccer Cup or the World Exposition is associated with a negative market reaction on the 
losing country stock exchange. 
A significant negative market reaction for the losing country is consistent with 
either shareholder value maximization when there is partial anticipation, or reflect 
investors’ sentiment. The positive/negative effects can be asymmetric reflecting that 
there are differential net potential benefits for the economies of the winning/losing 
countries. A stronger (negative) effect for losing countries is consistent with behavioral 
arguments. 
                                                      
17 The statistical null hypothesis tested in Section 5 is that the impact of the announcement of the event is null and so 
forth for the other hypotheses. 
 
18 A null impact may also reflect that the effects are trivial.  15
(iii) Individual industries that potentially benefit more from the event exhibit higher market 
reaction. 
A similar price impact across industries, regardless of the potential economic 
benefits they can extract from the event, is consistent with investor sentiment 
arguments. 
(iv) Abnormal returns (for the winning countries) vary across events and industries and are 
driven by the relative importance of the event (relative to the underlying economy), the time-span between 
the announcement and the realization of the event, and the degree of partial anticipation. 
Significant differences in the cross-section of abnormal returns are evidence 
against behavioral arguments that predict that the observed effects derive simply from 
investor sentiment. 
The predictions of the different theoretical arguments are as follows: 
Theoretical Arguments   
Observed Effects  Shareholder 
Maximization Hypothesis
Rational 
Expectations 
Myopic 
Investors 
Sentiment 
Winning country 
¾ aggregate stock market impact 
 
¾ more positive impact for selected 
industries 
 
Losing country 
¾ aggregate stock market impact 
 
Winning and Losing countries 
¾ variation across markets/events 
related to 
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4. Data and Empirical tests 
 
In this section we describe the tests we propose to evaluate these hypotheses and to 
disentangle the competing theoretical arguments. 
 
4.1. Data 
 
Announcement dates were gathered from several sources (through mail contact or   
websites): IOC (International Olympic Committee) for the Summer and Winter 
Olympic Games; FIFA (Fedération Internationale de Football Association) for the 
World Football Cups; UEFA (Union des Associations Européennes de Football) for the 
European Football Cups; Bureau International des Expositions for the World and 
Specialized Exhibitions; and the EC (European Commission) for the European Capitals 
of Culture. Please refer to appendix A for details. 
The sampling criterion was availability of daily of country and industry indices 
returns with at least half a year before the event. The final sample consists of 81 
announcements.
19 Table A.1. in appendix  lists the announcement dates. The first 
announcement date is May 16, 1955 and refers to the 1960 Summer Olympic Games 
hosted by Italy. The last announcement date in our sample is July 2, 2003 and refers to 
the 2010 Winter Olympic Games that will be hosted by Canada. The average lag 
between the announcement and the realization of the mega.events for the 81 events is 
57.5 months. 
 
 
                                                      
19 Some events are co-organized by two or more countries. For example Belgium and Netherlands organized the 2000 
European Football Cup together. In that case we consider them as separate observations.  17
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the events analyzed by type of event and by 
organizing country.
20 Our sample includes 6 Summer Olympic Games (1984 onwards), 8 
Winter Olympic Games (1988 onwards), 6 World Football Cups (1990 onwards), 10 
European Football Cups (1984 onwards), 11 World Exhibitions (1982 onwards), 10 
Specialized World Exhibitions (1980 onwards) and 30 European Capitals of Culture 
(1986 onwards). Even after excluding the European Capitals of Culture, Europe has 
been the most successful venue attracting these events. Worldwide, by country, the US 
is the top organizer followed by Japan, Canada, Germany and Italy. 
We also gathered information for the losing candidacies when available. This 
information, shown in table 2, was only available for a subset of events and dates.
21 The 
most active (not successful) bidder is Canada followed by Sweden.  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Returns for the winning and losing countries were obtained from Datastream 
and computed using a total return index measured in US dollars.
22 
For the multivariate analysis we use GDP and industrial production index data 
from IMF. Market capitalization data was obtained from Datastream. The Olympic 
Games voting results for the several rounds were obtained from Lyberg, Wolf 
"Fabulous 100 years of the IOC; facts, figures and much, much more", Lausanne, 1996, 
                                                      
20 There are a few cases for which there is no market information for the winning country when the nomination was 
announced. For example, this is true for the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in the former Soviet-Union or the 1988 
Winter Olympic Games in Korea.  
21 Stock market information was not available for several losing countries by the time of the nomination 
announcement (for example, China, in respect to the 2000 Summer Olympic Games or Morocco, in respect to the 
1998 and 2002 World Football Cups).  
22 Datastream indices were preferred over other domestic market and industry indices when available because they are 
constructed on a uniform basis across markets and are not backfilled with firms added or deleted from the index. The 
exception was the total return series for Spain general index (IBEX) obtained directly from Bolsa de Madrid.    18
pp. 308-313 and from the IOC website. The World Football Cup voting results were 
provided by FIFA. Appendix A describes the voting procedures. Table 3 summarizes 
the voting results for the winning and the losing second more voted countries over the 
several rounds.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
4.2. Empirical framework 
 
First we use a traditional event study approach to evaluate hypotheses (i), (ii), and (iii). 
For each market (or industry within a market) we estimate expected returns on the basis 
of a selected return generating process; then, we compute abnormal returns at and 
around the announcement date (and obtain variance/covariance information); we 
aggregate abnormal returns across markets and infer about the average effect.
23 
Second, we run cross-sectional regressions of the abnormal returns on the 
variables potentially influencing the magnitude of the market reaction to the mega-event 
announcements (and evaluate hypothesis iv). 
Third, we run further tests to analyze the role of partial anticipation and 
disentangle rational and behavioral arguments. 
 
4.2.1. Abnormal returns 
The methodology employed to measure the magnitude of stock price reactions to 
announcements is the standard abnormal returns technique based upon the several 
benchmarks described below. 
                                                      
23 To estimate and infer about the average impact of the event several other frameworks could be used. For example, 
one could jointly estimate, for each market, the return generating process parameters using time-series and the event 
impact by including a dummy that would be equal to 1 at the time of the announcement and 0 otherwise. The third 
step then would be similar: compute the cross-sectional average economic impact of the event by aggregating the 
individual firm parameters and infer. Most of the studies that analyzed mega-events perform only the first two steps, 
i.e., they only evaluate the significance of the effects for a single market.  19
We examine the impact of the nomination on returns as of the announcement 
date. We analyze several other windows to account for partial anticipation and leakages 
in information or delayed effects due to thin trading.  
Daily abnormal returns were calculated using constant-mean, market-adjusted 
and risk-adjusted methods described in Brown and Warner (1985).
24 The date of the 
announcement is designated as day t=0. Daily returns are collected for the period (t=-
140 to 20). The estimation and event periods were defined respectively as [-140, -21] 
and [-20, 20]. 
Abnormal returns, ARit, are obtained as the difference between observed (log) 
returns of the country i at event day t, Rit, and the expected return generated by a chosen 
benchmark Ε(Rit). Ε(Rit) is defined as follows, respectively for the constant-mean return, 
the market-adjusted and the risk-adjusted methods: 
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The presence of unequal integration of the countries analyzed makes it difficult 
to find a good model to the pricing of these securities. We assume that the degree of 
segmentation is fixed through the period of estimation of risk exposures and that 
markets are fully integrated with the world market.  We thus use an unconditional world 
market model. Parameters a and b were estimated regressing market index returns on 
the world market index over the estimation period. 
                                                      
24 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that the tests are not highly sensitive to the benchmark model of abnormal 
returns. Market-adjusted returns are not included here for all tests. Results are available upon request.   20
Averaging abnormal returns across markets in common event time, we obtain 
the average cross-sectional abnormal return given by: 
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where N is the number of countries in the sample.  
By cumulating the average residuals over a particular time interval (-20<t1<=0; 
0=<t2<20), we obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) as follows:
25 
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The procedure is similar when we analyze the effects for a particular industry. 
CAR are computed by first averaging daily abnormal industry returns across markets 
and then cumulating industry average abnormal returns over the days that comprise the 
event window under scrutiny.
26 To compute industry returns we use the 32 Datastream 
industry-level 4 index series. 
We use both parametric and non-parametric tests to assess the statistical 
significance of average abnormal returns. The use of several tests aims at ensuring the 
robustness of results when the usual assumptions of independence in the cross-section, 
constant variance or normality of returns are incorrect.
27 The parametric test statistics 
                                                      
25 Because we use continuously compounded returns, buy and hold returns for a specific time-span are achieved by 
simply summing the log returns. If we assume that discrete returns are distributed as iid log normal variables, 
cumulative log returns are normal distributed. 
26 The benchmarks to compute industry market- and risk-adjusted abnormal returns was the country’s total return 
market index. 
27 Kothari and Warner (2006) show that with short horizons, the usual test statistic is not highly sensitive to 
assumptions about the cross-sectional or times-series dependence or normality of returns. Further, they show that 
short horizon event study tests are generally well-specified but the power of the tests is sensitive to sample size and 
firm characteristics (such as volatility). For firms with low volatility, sample size of 20 is enough attain full power for a 
1% abnormal return.  21
examined are Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) with and without crude dependence 
adjustment, the standardized residual test and Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) 
standardized cross-sectional test. The non-parametric statistics are the sign test, Corrado 
(1989)’s rank test and Wilcoxon-signed rank test.
28 Please refer to Serra (2004) for 
details. 
 
4.2.2. Cross-sectional analysis 
To estimate the impact of the determinants on the cross-sectional variation of abnormal 
returns (and test hypothesis (iv)), we estimate the following equation using fixed effects 
for industries:
29 
  
+ + + + + + = j 5 j 4 j 3 j 2 j 1 0 js EXP REC LIQ LAG SIZE CAR β β β β β β   
js k k k j 7 js 6 D VOT REP η γ β β + + + + ∑      (7) 
where 
CARjs are the cumulative abnormal returns for industry s (in host country j); 
SIZEj is the ratio between the event capital expenditure and the host country j 
GDP; 
LAGj  is the time lag between the announcement and the moment of the event 
hosted by country j;  
LIQj  is the ratio between country j market capitalization and its GDP; 
RECj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at the time of the 
event hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; 
EXPj is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in expansion at the time of the 
event hosted by country j and 0 otherwise; 
                                                      
28 The tables below report the statistics for the usual Brown and Warner (1989, 1985) parametric tests and for the sign 
test. Other results are available upon request.  
29 We run the same regression for market CARs (instead of industry CARs) using OLS (instead of fixed effects) 
without the industry-specific variable REP.  22
REPjs is the ratio of industry s market capitalization and the overall capitalization 
of country j stock market; 
VOTj is the difference in the percentage of votes between winning country j and 
the losing country with the largest number of votes in the last round; 
Dk are dummies for each type of event (Olympic Games, etc.); and 
ηjs is an i.i.d. error term. 
 
The variable SIZE is motivated by Burton et al. (1999) that report that the 
market impact of capital expenditures announcements is stronger for larger projects. 
Yet, the findings of Woolridge and Snow (1990) do not confirm this relation. Given that 
we are comparing countries with very different economy sizes we use relative instead of 
absolute size.
30 
The variable LAG proxies investors’ myopia. Burton et al. (1999) and Woolridge 
and Snow (1990) fail to find any significant different effect in market reaction between 
long-term and short-term project announcements. 
Our main variable of interest is VOT. We expect that the smaller the difference 
in the percentage of votes between the two candidates in the last round, the larger the 
surprise in the announcement news and therefore the larger the impact on prices.  
We also control for a set of variables found important by previous studies. LIQ 
tries to capture how well the economic output of a particular country is mirrored in its 
stock market. REP is an industry-specific variable to control for the importance of a 
particular industry in the stock market. To accommodate the findings of McQueen and 
Roley (1993) that report a negative relation between market impact and economic 
activity, we also include the variables REC and EXP. These variables proxy economy-
wide activity. We follow McQueen and Roley (1993) methodology to define economic 
                                                      
30 Veraros et al. (2004) argue that the difference in the reaction of Athens and Milan stock exchanges could result 
from economy size differences (Greece and Italy) and the importance of the two cities potentially hosting the event 
(Athens and Rome) and, as such, a much stronger effect on the national economy of Greece.  23
states.
31 Finally, we include dummies for the type of event and allow for industry fixed 
effects to account for differential benefits across industries. 
 
4.2.3. Partially Anticipated Effects 
We  analyze two specifications to evaluate the role of partial anticipation.  
 
Partial Anticipation I 
On the basis of the model derived in appendix B, we propose the following 
empirical testable model: 
 
) 8 ( D p CAR i i i i µ δ φ α + + + =  
where  
CARi  are the cumulative abnormal returns over the event window for country i 
aggregate market index; (i=winners, losers) 
pi is defined as the probability of country i hosting the event; 
Di is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country i is nominated and 0 
otherwise; and 
µi is a i.i.d. error term. 
 
To estimate α, φ and δ we pool the cumulative abnormal returns of the winning 
and losing countries across events.  
If the country is chosen to host (or not host) the event, expected abnormal 
returns are given by, respectively: 
 
                                                      
31 McQueen e Roley (1993): “We use the seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production index, to define economic 
states. First, we estimate a trend in log of industrial production by regressing the actual log of industrial production on 
a constant and a time trend. Then we add and subtract a constant from the trend, creating the upper and lower 
bounds … so that the log of industrial production is above the upper bound, denoted as “high” economic activity, 25 
percent of the time. The log of industrial production is below the lower bound, indicating “low” economic activity, 
about 25 percent of the time as well. “Medium” economic activity is represented by the remaining observations 
between the bounds.”  24
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Given the expressions (A-4) and (A-5) in appendix 
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where Vj-1 and Vl-1 denote, respectively, the winning country j and the losing country l 
market valuation just before the event is announced; NPVj and NPVl stand for the 
economic impact of the event for each country.   
Rational arguments yield the following predictions: 
- α=0, φ<0, δ>0  
Assuming that the effects observed reflect solely the economic impact of the 
event (i.e., α=0), δ and φ will capture all the relevant effects. φ reflects that stock prices  25
will adjust downwards for the losing country in the unanticipated effect (that the 
country would lose). φpj+δ  reflects the upwards adjustment in stock prices for the 
winning country in the unanticipated effect (that the country would win). If the 
economic impact of the event was similar for the two countries (in percentage of its 
actual market capitalization), δ would capture the total economic impact of the project. 
Ceteris paribus, the greater the impact of the project (NPV), the larger the magnitude of 
the parameters, δ and φ. When the event is not anticipated at all, δ captures the full 
economic impact for the winning country (E(CARj)=δ and E(CARl)=0). 
 
If stock prices are influenced by sentiment, the above parameters must be 
reinterpreted. Given that the parameter δ  could now reflect the effect of positive 
sentiment, and assuming that in that setting parameter φ could be disregarded (φ=0, 
prices would be affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the objective probability of 
observing the event), α  would capture the negative sentiment in prices. Further, if 
sentiment effects are more pronounced when the country looses, then |α|>|δ|. 
The testable predictions for the behavioral arguments are the following. 
-  δ>0  and  α<0 (positive sentiment for winners and negative sentiment for 
losers); 
- |α|>|δ| (asymmetric sentiment effects);  
Notice that if the α estimate is negative and significantly different from zero, 
one can disentangle rational and behavioral arguments. 
  
Partial Anticipation II 
To account for market expectations in (8), we use the percentage of votes 
received by the country in the last round. This may be considered an objective prior 
probability assuming rational expectations. Yet, the selection process is highly 
competitive and, in the successive rounds of voting, the ranking is often reversed, and 
front runners are many times overtaken by other candidates.  One could argue that  26
initial and intermediate rankings also influence investors’ expectations. To account for 
that, we tested the following alternative specification: 
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where  
CARi and Di are defined as in (8); (i=winners, losers) 
PSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial 
surprise  and 0 otherwise;  
TSi is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are an 
almost total surprise and 0 otherwise; and 
ωi is an i.i.d. error term. 
 
The specification (13) accommodates the fact that investors form their 
expectations on the basis of all rounds of voting. Further we also take into account the 
country bidding record. The motivation for including this piece of information is 
grounded on the idea that the selection outcome is influenced by the lobbying power of 
the candidacies (Veraros, et al. (2004)): if the country did bid for hosting the last event 
and lost, investors may perceive that the lobbying power is limited and anticipate that, 
once again the candidacy will not succeed. 
We classify the announcement news as total surprises, out of line to market 
expectations, when:  
- for the winning country, the country did not consistently lead the ranking in 
the previous voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; 
- for the losing country, the country lead the ranking in some of the previous 
voting rounds, and had not bid for hosting the previous event. 
Announcement news are classified as partial surprises when:  
- for the winning country, the country consistently lead the ranking in all the 
previous voting rounds, and had bid for hosting the previous event; or the country did  27
not lead the ranking in all previous voting rounds but had not bid for hosting the 
previous event. 
- for the losing country, the country never lead the ranking in the successive 
voting rounds, but had not bid for hosting the previous event; or the country lead the 
ranking in only one of the previous voting rounds but had bid for hosting the previous 
event. 
Expected abnormal returns for the winning and losing bidders for the cases of 
total surprise and partial surprise can be summarized as follows: 
 
Surprise/Country Winning  Loosing 
No Surprise  ϕ0+λ0  λ0 
Partial Surprise  ϕ0+ϕ1+λ0+λ1 ϕ0+ϕ1 
Total Surprise  ϕ0+ϕ2+λ0+λ1 ϕ0+ϕ2 
 
Rational arguments yield the following predictions for the winning country: 
- ϕ0+λ0 = 0; ϕ0+ ϕ1+λ0+λ1 >0; ϕ0+ ϕ1+λ0+λ2 > 0; and  
ϕ0+ ϕ2+λ0+λ2 > ϕ0+ ϕ1+λ0+λ1. 
As for the losing country, the predictions are: 
- ϕ0 = 0; ϕ0+ϕ1 < 0; ϕ 0+ϕ2 < 0; and|ϕ0+ϕ2| > |ϕ0+ϕ1|. 
If there is no surprise, abnormal returns as of the announcement date should be 
null. The greater the surprise, the greater the positive (negative) impact of the 
nomination news for the winning (losing) country. 
 
Behavioral arguments predict that: 
- ϕ0+λ0 > 0; ϕ0 < 0; and - ϕ0>λ0/2 (asymmetrical effect). 
As in (8), if prices were affected by investor sentiment, regardless of the 
objective probability of observing the event, the behavioral effect would be subsumed 
by parameters ϕ0 and λ0.      
  28
5. Results 
 
In this section we present and discuss the observed valuation effects as of the date of 
the announcement of the country nomination to host a mega-event, as well as the 
findings in terms of what factors drive the observed results. Section 5.1 discusses the 
magnitude and significance of the observed abnormal returns at the announcement date. 
Section 5.2 presents the results for the cross-sectional analysis and section 5.3. presents 
the estimates for the proposed model specifications of partial anticipation. 
 
5.1. Abnormal returns 
 
The average abnormal returns are shown in tables 4, 5 and 6. Table A.2 in appendix 
shows the abnormal results for each individual host country. 
 
5.1.1 Winning Countries 
Aggregate Market Reaction 
 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
The first hypothesis that we test is whether the announcement of a mega-event is 
associated with a positive stock market reaction on the nominated country. Table 4 
shows the abnormal returns at and around the moment the nomination information was 
released, for each type of event. The table shows the abnormal returns controlling for 
worldwide market effects that we assume to be unaffected from that particular country 
specific event. We present market-model and mean-adjusted CARs and significance 
tests for four windows of interest: [-1,1], [0,0], [0,1] and [0,5].
32  
                                                      
32 We looked upon other significance parametric and non parametric tests. Results are not reported here to save 
space. The significance of the results discussed in the paper is barely unchanged.  29
  We observe no significant stock market reaction at the announcement dates. 
This is true for all the events we analyze except for a positive reaction at the 
announcement of Specialized Exhibitions: the sign test shows that 8 out the 10 
countries in sample showed a positive abnormal return. Overall the magnitude of the 
observed market reaction is economically and statistically insignificant. 
  The magnitude and significance of the CARs for the other windows analyzed is 
not significantly from zero with two exceptions: market-model CARs register a positive 
significant effect for the Specialized Exhibitions over the window periods [0,1] and [0,5]; 
and there is a negative significant CAR [-1,1] for the European Capitals of Culture. In  
both cases the results are barely significant and only if we use non-parametric tests. 
The evidence does not suggest a differential market reaction for sport or cultural 
events. The only statistically significant result we observe regards a cultural event but the 
relation could be spurious. 
 
Individual Markets Reaction 
As noted above, we expect that the impact varies across events and markets reflecting 
several factors such as the importance of the event relative to the underlying economy 
or the degree of partial anticipation. The results in table 4 could thus reflect that there is 
considerable variation across individual markets. Table A.2 in appendix shows the stock 
market abnormal returns for each nominated country. We concentrate here on the 
effects at the announcement date [0,0]. We observe that some markets experience 
positive returns while others experience negative returns but in most cases these are not 
statistically significant.  
We observe significant positive abnormal returns for:  
-  Greece (+7.8%), regarding the announcement of the nomination to host the 
2004 Olympic Games; this result is consistent with Veraros et al. (2004) They  30
find that upon the announcement of the nomination, there was a positive and 
significant effect on the Athens Stock Exchange general index;
33 
-  Sweden (+1.5%) regarding the 1992 European Football Cup; 
-  China (+1.9%, marginally significant at 10%) regarding the 2010 World 
Exhibition; 
-  Belgian (+0.95%) regarding the 2000 European Capital of Culture. 
As for the significant negative abnormal returns, these are: 
-  the US (-2.6%) regarding the 1980 Winter Olympic Games; 
-  Italy (-1.7%) regarding the 1990 World Football Cup; 
-  Germany (-1.1%)  regarding the 1988 European Football Cup; 
-  Netherlands (-1.3%) regarding the 2000 European Football Cup; 
-  Spain  (-1.6%) regarding the 1992 World Exhibition; 
-  Sweden (-2.5%), Germany (-2.0%), Czech Republic (-1.4%) respectively, 
regarding the European Capitals of Culture of 1998, 1999 and 2000. 
These negative reactions are consistent with myopic investors that penalize long-
term investments.
34 
Thus, regarding our first hypothesis, we cannot reject the null of no significant 
average aggregate market reaction to the announcements of hosting country 
nominations. The individual market analysis suggests that some markets react positively 
to the announcement of mega-events while others react negatively. Yet, overall, the 
effect is trivial and, on average, not significantly different from zero. The results hold 
across different event categories. The findings seem to be fairly robust: abnormal 
performance remains economically and statistically insignificant at and around the 
announcement date regardless of the model we use to compute abnormal returns or the 
chosen parametric or non parametric test we use to assess significance.  
                                                      
33 Yet the authors document that there were no significant effects on the general index for the losing country (Italy). 
34 Alternatively one could argue that the market perceives these (in most cases public) investments as economy-wide 
damaging projects. The reasons for pursuing these mega-projects would have to be mostly  political.  31
This non-significant average impact is consistent with rational expectations. Yet 
the results of the individual market analysis show that the impact is varying and, for 
some markets (or events), the effects are positive and statistically significant, and this 
latter evidence contradicts perfect anticipation.  
 
Individual Industries Reaction 
 
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
 
We now examine hypothesis (iii). We evaluate the price impact of the announcement at 
an industry-level. We compute industry CARs for 32 individual industries. For each 
industry we compute the cumulative cross-market average abnormal return. Our 
primary interest is to examine whether those industries that were a priori identified as 
directly gaining from the organization of the event, did observe more positive significant 
abnormal returns. Table 5 shows the announcement date ARs and the announcement 
date to next-day CARs for seven industries: Beverages, Construction, Leisure and 
Tourism, Media, Retail, Communications and Transportation.
35 The last row of each 
panel shows the grand mean (across all industries). Panels A to G contain the results for 
each event category. 
  Let’s start with the grand mean abnormal return. Overall the results are similar 
to those in table 4: the effect is economically and statistically insignificant.
36 As 
highlighted above, there seems to be a positive effect associated with the 
announcements of Specialized Exhibitions (+0.5%). Additionally, the Winter Olympic 
Games show now a negative effect (-1.0%). These results are statistically significant for 
the constant-mean residuals. 
                                                      
35 Results for the other industries are not reported here to save space. 
36 The aggregate values shown at the bottom of table 5 are equally-weighted averages of industry indices. The 
comparison of these equally-weighted values with the value-weighted averages reported in table 4, show that market 
weights do not drive the results.  32
  When we examine the individual industry abnormal returns, we fail to find 
consistent positive returns for the selected industries and, in most cases, the effects are 
small and not statistically different from zero. We observe (marginally) positive effects 
for the following industries: 
-  Communications (+0.7%) regarding the World Exhibitions; 
-  Retail (+0.9%) regarding the World Football Cups; 
-  Construction (+1.2%) regarding the Summer Olympic Games; 
-  Media (0.6%) for the European Capitals of Culture.  
Yet we also find significant negative effects for a couple of industries. These are: 
-  Media (-1.7%) regarding the Winter Olympic Games;  
-  Transportation (-2.1%) regarding the European Football Cups. 
These results are inconsistent with value-maximization theories because we fail to 
observe a positive significant effect for industries that a priori would benefit from the 
event. In any case, as above, results could reflect that these effects have already been 
anticipated by investors. 
The results discussed in this and in the previous sections are not consistent with 
sentiment arguments because we do not observe a general positive effect that would 
reflect the joy associated with the nomination. Yet it can be argued that the sentiment 
effect will be more strongly reflected if the country is not nominated. Prices would 
reflect misery not joy. The next section examines the market impact felt by the losing 
countries. 
 
5.1.2 Losing Countries 
 
 [TABLE 6 HERE] 
 
We now shift to the impact of the announcement on the losing countries stock market 
prices. Hypothesis (ii) was that the announcement of the nomination would affect 
negatively the losing country stock market. This result would indicate that, prior to the  33
announcement, market expectations included the likelihood country could win and 
benefit from the organization of the event. When the country loses, prices adjust 
downwards. Alternatively, a negative reaction could be merely associated with 
sentimental failure.  
Table 6 shows the aggregate stock market effects for losers. Our sub-sample 
includes only those countries for which there was information regarding the losing 
candidates. Because of that, we had to exclude some of the World and all the European 
Football Cups. We also excluded the Specialized Exhibitions and the European Capitals 
of Culture because these were single candidacies-events. Further we excluded some 
losers for which market price information was not available. The final sub-sample 
comprises thus fifteen announcements (5 Olympic Summer Games, 5 Olympic Winter 
Games, 1 World Football Cup and 4 World Exhibitions. 
We do not find a statistical significant negative market reaction as the partial 
anticipation or sentiment arguments would predict. On the contrary, for the specific 
case of the World Exhibitions we even observe a couple of positive CARs. Overall 
results are consistent with perfect anticipation. 
 
5.1.3. Summary of Abnormal Performance 
The bulk of the evidence so far is consistent with the rational expectations 
hypothesis or full anticipation. As observed above, the rational expectations hypothesis 
admits that  such announcements will not affect the market value of listed firms because 
these news would imply no change in investment opportunities. The announcements 
would simply label anticipated growth opportunities. The results of the individual 
market analysis show a wide variation in the price impact observed. Below, we 
investigate whether between the variation in impact (across markets and events) is 
systematically related to factors such as economy-wide differential benefits or partial 
anticipation. 
 
  34
5.2.  Cross-sectional analysis 
 
5.2.1.  Variables  
We evaluate the relation between the observed abnormal performance and a set of 
event, market and industry attributes as proposed by the empirical specification in (7). 
Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted returns. Table A.3 in appendix presents 
descriptive information for the variables of interest included in the cross-sectional 
analysis. The data shown are the mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard 
deviation of some characteristics of the events (relative size, lag and differential in votes 
received by the winning country in excess of the other final candidate), in aggregate and 
for each category or type of event. The table refers to a subset (32) of the events 
analyzed above for which information was available. These are 6 Summer Olympic 
Games, 8 Winter Olympic Games, 1 World Football Cup, 10 World Exhibitions and 7 
Specialized Exhibitions. 
The average mega-event has an investment of around 1% of the country GNP, 
is announced 6 years in advance, and gets 56% votes more than the losing country in 
the last round of voting. 
On average, mega-events involve an investment of 1.24% of the host country 
GDP. Yet the median event is much smaller, of a magnitude of 0.17% of the host 
country GDP. The standard deviation is 1.74% and ranges from 0.002% (the 1980 
Specialized Exhibition in Canada) to a maximum of 10.56% (the 1992 Summer Olympic 
Games in Spain). When we split the sample into groups according to the type of event, 
we observe that the most important type of event are the Summer Olympic Games, that 
show an average (median) relative size of 3.3% (1.7%), followed by the Olympic Winter 
Games and the World Exhibitions that register the same average of 1.1%. Specialized 
Exhibitions show the lowest percentages with an average of less than 0.1%. On 
aggregate, and for any type of event analyzed, there seems to be no positive or negative  35
deterministic trend over time in the relative amounts invested (even if increasing in 
absolute terms).
37 
The average (median) event is held 69 (71) months after its announcement and 
ranges between 1 (again the 1980 Specialized Exhibition in Canada) and 10 years (and 
again the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Spain).
38 Specialized Exhibitions take on 
average 49 months to be completed, against an average of 78, 69 and 76 months 
respectively for the Summer Olympic Games, the Winter Olympic Games and the 
World Exhibitions. The results suggest a positive relation between the size of the event 
and the time it takes to develop (and therefore the need to be announced in advance): 
this is the case for the 1992 Summer Olympic Games in Spain, whose investment 
amounted to 10.56% of GNP and was announced 10 years in advance. The correlation 
coefficient between the two variables is positive (18.6%) but not statistically significant. 
The average (median) percent of votes received by the winning country in excess 
of the other final candidate just before the outcome of the bidding process is revealed is 
56% (39%). This result suggests that the outcome of these biddings is largely 
anticipated. In fact, this is the case for the Specialized Exhibitions for which, in all cases, 
there was only a single candidacy. As for the World Exhibitions, only the four more 
recent ones were competitive biddings. This is not the case for other events for which 
the bidding process is rather competitive like the Olympic Games and the Football 
Cups. The information regarding the voting rounds is only publicly available for the 
Olympic Games, the World Exhibitions and, very recently, also for the World Football 
Cups. The Olympic Games seem to be the most highly competitive biddings: the 
average (median) difference in votes between the winning and losing countries in the 
last round is respectively 28.8% and 32.7% (20.3% and 27.5%) for the Winter and 
Summer Games with a minimum of 2.3% (2000 Summer Olympic Games in Australia). 
                                                      
37 “Beijing's Olympics-related spending of around $35 billion, they calculated, would make up more than 43% of the 
total for all the games, including Beijing's, since Montreal's in 1976”, The Economist, March 1, 2007. 
38 World Football Cups are announced 6 years in advance while European Football Cups were traditionally 
announced 4 years in advance but, in the more recent years, the announcement has been made earlier (about 5 years 
in advance).    36
The average (median) difference in votes for the 5 World Football Cups, for which 
voting results have been made publicly available, is 34.7% (26.3%) with a minimum of 
4.3% for the 2006 Cup in Germany.
39 As for the World Exhibitions, the average 
(median) difference in votes is 66.9% (100%).
40 
To save space we do not report here the statistics for the control variables used 
in the analysis. These include, at the market-level, the variable LIQ that proxies for 
differences in the role of the stock market across countries, and the indicator variables 
for economic activity, REC and EXP; at the industry-level, the variable REP is meant to 
capture the importance of a particular industry in total market capitalization. On 
average, stock markets represent 34% of GNP. Out of the total announcements only 
9.4% occurred in recessions, while 37.5% occurred in expansions. This asymmetry is 
surprising given that in most cases, as we have seen above, the announcements of the 
nominations occur regularly to allow enough time for the organization of the event and, 
in some instances, for the development of the required infrastructures to host the event. 
It is thus very unlikely that the selection committee times the announcement, and the 
result must be either spurious or reflecting above-average economic performance over 
the sample period. Finally the average (median) value for REP is 3.8% (1.9%) ranging 
from near zero to 49%. 
 
5.2.2.  GLS estimates  
We regress cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[0,1]) against the set of variables 
described in the previous section. Table 7 shows the estimated coefficients of the 
industry fixed effects regressions for two specifications (with and without the variable 
REP). We use a total of 699/701 pooled industry observations regarding 32 events. 
 
                                                      
39 This was a very tight victory: Germany secured 12 out of the 23 votes against the 12 received by South Africa (the 
other candidate in the final round).  
40 The minimum was 2.4% for the 2000 World Exhibition: Germany secured 21 out the 41 votes against the 20 
received by Canada.  37
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
The regressions show an adjusted R-square of 19% and estimates are similar for 
the two specifications.  We find statistically significant coefficients for the independent 
variables LAG, VOT and REP as well as for the two dummies D_WSG and D_WE. 
As for the variable LAG, the coefficient is economically and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Consistent with the investors’ myopia hypothesis, the 
reaction to the announcement is smaller the larger the lag between the announcement 
and the realization of the event. For each further month, the CAR declines by 0.01%. 
The coefficient associated with the variable VOT is also very significant (at 1% 
level) and is consistent with investors partially anticipating the outcome of the bidding 
process. The more competitive the voting process (i.e., the smaller the difference in 
votes between the winning and the losing candidates), the larger the surprise and the 
greater the market impact. For a decline of 10% in the difference between the 
percentage of votes for winning and losing bidders, the CAR increases 0.23%. 
The coefficient of the control variable REP is significant at a 5% level. This 
positive relation between industry market weight and price impact could reflect 
awareness. If the industry is well-represented, investors will be more inclined to believe 
that mega-event news will affect the companies belonging to that industry. 
The results for the OLS regressions using market (instead of industry) CARs are 
weak. The signs of the parameters are the same but the estimates lack statistical 
significance. This could directly stem from small sample size (32 events, 23 degrees of 
freedom). 
 
5.2.3. Summary 
The estimates of the cross-sectional regressions results confirm that abnormal returns 
are lower when the outcome is predictable and the larger the time-span between the 
announcement and the realization of the event. No general statement can be made 
regarding the economic merit of hosting mega-events but the evidence suggests that  38
investors react as if some countries benefit from the organization of some mega-events 
such as the World Exhibitions. 
 
5.3. Partial anticipation 
 
5.3.1 Partial anticipation I 
To evaluate the role of partial anticipation we test the model specification in (8). We 
pool the CARs for winners and losers. Our sample comprises 39 observations (24 
winners and 15 losers).  
 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
Panel A of Table 8 gives the results. The parameter associated with the prior 
probability of winning is negative (but not statistically significant). As for the parameter 
associated with the dummy for the nomination, we observed a positive and statistically 
significant estimate. The fit of the regression is poor but the evidence suggests that the 
effects are consistent with the rational predictions of the model proposed in Appendix 
B:  
-  losers register, on average, negative price impacts and the magnitude of the 
effect  is associated with their priors of winning, and  
-  winners register, on average, positive price impacts; the magnitude of the effect 
is positively (negatively) related with the degree of surprise (anticipation) in the 
nomination news. 
The evidence is not consistent with behavioral arguments. The sign of the intercept 
estimate is against the prediction (positive instead of negative) and not statistically 
different from zero. 
   We also run the regression with a balanced sample, including only those events 
for which we had information regarding the winning and for the losing bidders., i.e., we 
only (14 events, 28 observations -14 winners and 14 losers). The results are inconclusive.   39
 
5.3.2 Partial anticipation II 
We now turn to the alternative specification model of partial anticipation in (13). This 
specification uses a more refined proxy of the degree of surprise (anticipation) in the 
announcement news, using the information in all the successive rounds of voting. 
 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
 
The regression results are shown in table 9.  As for the previous model we 
estimate the model with unbalanced and balanced samples (panels A and B, 
respectively). To evaluate the effects for the winning and losing countries we perform a 
series of linear tests of the estimated parameters.  
The fit of the model is good and similar for the unbalanced and balanced 
samples (adjusted R-square of 46% and 60%, respectively). We comment upon Panel A 
given that both panels show very similar results . 
Overall the estimated parameters are in line with the rational predictions. We 
observe that: 
-  (1) when the outcome of the bidding process contains little or no news (in other 
words, there is partial or no surprise) there is no significant market reaction for the 
losers: Intercept+PS (-0.32%) and Intercept (0.54%) are not statistically significant. For the 
winning countries, the effect is negative (Intercept+D=-0.68%) and significant at the 10% 
level, if no surprise, and negative but not statistically significant if partial surprise 
(Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=-0.89%).  
-   (2) when the outcome of the bidding process is a total surprise, the market 
reaction is negative and statistically significant for losers (Intercept+TS=-3.31%). For the 
nominated countries we observe a very significant positive reaction 
(Intercept+TS+D*TS=+4.96%) We reject the null that the effects are the same for partial 
or total surprises.   40
- (3) the results in (1) and (2) are generally inconsistent with sentiment arguments; 
further when we test for an asymmetric effect, we observe that, even when we control 
for partial anticipation, there are no stronger negative effects for losers.  
 
5.3.3. Summary 
The results of the partial anticipation models show that, when we control for prior 
expectations, the announcement of mega-events is associated with a positive market 
reaction in the nominated country and a negative reaction in the losing country. The 
greater the surprise, the greater the positive (negative) impact of the nomination news 
for the winning (losing) country. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates the impact of international sporting and cultural events on 
national stock markets. We study market reaction to the announcement of the selected 
country hosting the Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the World Football Cup, the 
European Football Cup and World and Specialized Exhibitions. Using a cross-section 
of 81 events, we find that the abnormal returns measured at the announcement date are 
not consistently different from zero. When we look at particular industries, we find no 
evidence supporting that industries, that a priori were more likely to extract direct 
benefits from the event, observe stronger effects. We also find insignificant CARs for 
losing bidders. Given that for most of the events we study, the outcome is partially 
anticipated by investors, the market reaction around the announcement date does not 
seem to accurately measure the perceived economic impact  of these events. In fact, 
when we control for the prior expectations upon the outcome of the voting, the 
announcement of mega-events is associated with a positive market reaction in the 
nominated country and a negative reaction in the losing country. Overall we interpret 
our findings as supportive of rational asset pricing and partial anticipation: when the  41
announcement news are total surprises, market reaction is significant, positive for 
winners and negative for losers, reflecting that investors evaluate these mega-events 
announcements as positive news. 
Our main results seem to hold for different definitions of abnormal 
performance and using a battery of tests to assess statistical significance and alternative 
empirical specifications to control for anticipation. 
The market reaction we observe seems to reflect only a part of the overall 
perceived economic benefit of these mega-events. It is thus not correct to extrapolate 
these results to judge the economic merit of hosting these mega-events. The evidence 
suggests further that the economic benefits of hosting these mega-events vary across 
markets and events. The main finding of our study is that part of the variation in market 
reaction is associated with the degree of anticipation of the outcome of the bidding 
process. Further work is required to establish the other determinants of the observed 
cross-sectional variation in market reaction.  42
Appendix A. Typology of Events 
I. THE OLYMPIC GAMES 
www.olympic.org 
The Olympic Games is an international multi-sport event comprised of summer and winter 
events. Since 1994, each season's games have been held every four years, two years apart. The 
most recent Summer Olympics were the 2004 Games in Athens, Greece  and the most recent 
Winter Olympics were the 2006 Games in Turin, Italy. 
The host selection process is a highly competitive procedure. The process consists of 
successive rounds of voting. In every round candidates with the least votes are left behind. If no 
candidate secures votes in excess of 50%, there are repetitive rounds until two candidates 
remain. In the last round of two, the country with more votes win. 
II. WORLD FOOTBALL CUPS 
www.fifa.com 
The World Cup is organized by FIFA- Fedération Internationale de Football Association. The 
World Cup is held every four years. Nations all over the world compete in regional qualifying 
matches for the 32 places in the final tournament. Places are awarded to each region based on 
the number and quality of national teams in the area (ex: ELO ratings). Up to 1994, the finals 
were played in Europe and Latin America. Of the last 4 tournaments 2 were organized outside 
its traditional regions, in particular, in the US and in Japan/Korea. The last World Football Cup 
was held in Germany in 2006. 
The decision on the country organizer is made upon several rounds of voting by 
members (regional football confederations) of the venue selection committee. The voting 
procedure is the following: voting will take place in successive rounds until one candidate 
receives a majority of those voting. If no candidate city achieves a majority in the first round, the 
candidate with the fewest votes drops out of the running, and the members vote again on the 
remaining candidates.  
III. EUROPEAN FOOTBALL CUPS 
www.uefa.com 
European Football Cups are held every 4 years. The first European Nations’ Cup, now known 
as the UEFA European Championship, was held in 1958. The bid process for staging UEFA  43
EURO has been changing over time. In recent years the process involves an  initial pre-selection 
of the potential bidders followed by the submission of initial bid dossiers by candidates. The 
final decision on the host of UEFA EURO is taken by UEFA Executive Committee. The last 
European Football Cup was held in Portugal in 2004. 
IV. WORLD EXHIBITIONS AND SPECIALIZED EXHIBITIONS 
www.bie-paris.org 
World (Universal or International) Exhibitions are held every five years. From having been 
exhibitions of state-of-the-art technological achievement, they are now broad national 
manifestations where the participating countries present themselves in their entirety. The rules 
are set by the Bureau International of World Exposition (BIE). Potential host nations apply to 
the BIE to hold a BIE-sanctioned Expo to celebrate some special event or to represent a 
concept or theme of their choosing. Under the more recent protocol (1988) there are two types 
of exposition – “registered” and “recognized”. The registered expos are to be held every 5 years 
starting in 2010 In between the “registered expos”, there will be one “recognized” exposition. 
The last World Exhibition was held in Aichi (Japan) in 2005. 
Specialized expositions are also supervised by BIE but unlike World expositions, there 
was no set time between specialized expositions. The last Specialized Exhibition was held in 
Rostock (Germany) in 2003. 
V. EUROPEAN CAPITALS OF CULTURE 
http://ec.europa.eu/culture/eac/other_actions/cap_europ/cap_eu_en.html 
The European City of Culture project was launched in 1985. The European Cities of Culture 
have been chosen until 2004, on an intergovernmental basis. Since then, the European Capitals 
of Culture are designated each year by the Council of Ministers of the EU, on the basis of the 
view of a selection panel41. In 2006, Patras (Greece) was the selected city. 
                                                      
41 The selection procedure is laid down in Decision 1419/1999/CE amended by Decision 649/2005/CE. This 
Decision sets out a chronological list of Member States entitling them to host the event in turn. It defines as well the 
criteria the cities have to comply with to be designated as European Capital of Culture. Each Member State is invited 
to submit its application for one or more cities at least four years in advance.  44
Appendix B. A model of market impact of partially anticipated events 
This appendix presents a simple model of partial anticipation that generates a set of 
hypotheses tested in our study.  The model we propose is built upon the models 
proposed by Malatesta and Thompson (1985) and Edmans, García and Norli (2007). 
As in Malatesta and Thomson (1985), we consider that investors partially 
anticipate the likelihood that a particular country hosts one or several international 
sporting or cultural events. Let’s denote pi as the probability of country i hosting the 
event. Before the nominated host country is announced, the anticipated economic 
impact of the event is already reflected in the market valuations of the bidding countries. 
The economic impact of a particular event (its net present value) for candidate country 
listed firms is denoted by NPV.
42  If country j is chosen to host the contest, the 
(positive) market price effect at the date of announcement is given by (1-pj) x NPVj. The 
observed market impact is thus a biased estimate of the true economic effect and is 
inversely related to the prior probability of winning. As for the market impact of the 
candidate countries whose bids were rejected, the loser countries, we should observe a 
negative market effect following the announcement, and, in absolute terms, positively 
related with the prior probability of winning. If we focus on the two countries in the last 
round of the voting process, when the final outcome is announced, the market price 
effect for the losing country l is given by –pl NPVl  that equals -(1-pj)NPVl. 
The potential benefits brought by the organization event are likely to be 
different from country to country (NPV  varies across bidding candidates) and 
consequently the absolute magnitude of the stock market effects to winners and losers 
can differ substantially. As such, a priori, asymmetric effects are expected for the 
winning and losing countries. 
                                                      
42 Any interaction between the implementation of this project and the likelihood of future projects is ignored. For 
example, if a particular country is not nominated,, the probability of being chosen to host the same or similar events 
in the future may decrease – for example, European countries host the European Cities of Culture in turn - or 
increase – a country may be chosen to host the World Football Cup after successfully organizing an European 
Football Cup.  45
In assessing the probability of winning (loosing), investors may consider the 
degree of competitiveness of the contest, whether the country is considered to be a 
front runner in advance and the initial rounds of the voting (that are publicized before 
the final outcome is realized). Our empirical model in section 4 accommodates some of 
these features. 
At the day of the announcement, two possible outcomes may result. Either the 
country wins the organization of the event or looses.  Let’s denote VW as the market 
valuation of a particular  country at time 0 if it hosts the event and VL its market 
valuation otherwise. Market valuation just before the event is announced (t=-1) for a 
candidate country is thus given by: 
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and  E(Ri) is the company’s expected return for a given return generating 
process. 
 
For the winning country j,    VW V j 0j = , and abnormal returns are thus given by:  
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Table 1   
Events analyzed: hosting country and type of event  
(number of events organized in parentheses) 
Hosting Country 
/Type of Event 
Summer 
Olympic 
Games 
Winter Olympic 
Games  
World Football 
Cups 
European Football 
Cups World  Exhibitions 
World Specialized 
Exhibitions 
European Capitals of 
Culture 
(81)  (6) (8) (6)     (10)  (11)  (10)  (30) 
EUROPE (58) 
Germany (8)      2006  1988  2000  1983 / 1993 / 2003  1988 / 1999 
Austria (2)        2008      2003 
Belgian (3)        2000      2000 / 2002 
Denmark (1)              1996 
Spain (5)  1992        1992    1992 / 2000 / 2002 
Finland (1)              2000 
France (7)    1992  1998  1984      1989 / 1993 / 2000 / 2004
Greece (3)  2004            1997 / 2006 
Netherlands (5)        2000    1982 / 2002  1987 / 2001 
Ireland  (2)            1991  /  2005 
Italy (7)    2006  1990  1980    1992  1986 / 2000 / 2004 
Norway (2)    1994          2000 
Poland (1)              2000 
Portugal (3)        2004  1998    2001 
United Kingdom (4)        1996    1984  1990 / 2008 
Czech Republic (1)              2000 
Sweden (2)        1992      1998 
Switzerland (1)        2008       
NORTH AMERICA (11) 
Canada (4)    1988 / 2010      1986  1980   
USA (7)  1984 / 1996  1980 / 2002  1994    1982 / 1984     
ASIA (10) 
Japan (5)    1998  2002    1985 / 2005  1990   
South Korea (2)      2002    1993     
China (3)  2008        2010  1999   
OCEANY (2) 
Australia (2)  2000        1988    52
Table 2   
Events analyzed: losing candidacies  
(number of bids in parentheses) 
Losing Country/ Type 
of Event  Summer Olympic Games  Winter Olympic Games World Football Cup World Exhibitions 
  (13)  (13)  ( 2)   (6) 
EUROPE (19) 
Germany (1)  2000       
Austria (1)    2010     
France (2)  1992 / 2008       
Greece (N=1)  1996       
Italy (2)  2004  1988     
Norway (1)    1992     
United Kingdom (2)  2000    2006   
Russia (1)        2010 
Sweden (5)  2004 
1992 / 1994 / 1998 / 
2002 
 
 
Switzerland (2)    2002 / 2006     
Turkey (1)  2008       
NORTH AMERICA (9) 
Canada (6)  1996 / 2008  2002    1998 / 2000 / 2005 
USA (2)    1994 / 1998     
Mexico (1)        2010 
ASIA (3) 
Japan (1)  1988       
South Korea (2)    2010    2010 
AFRICA (2) 
South Africa (2)  2004    2006   
OCEANY (1) 
Australia (1)  1996       
  53
Table 3   
Events analyzed: voting results for the winning and losing countries over the several rounds 
 
PANEL A. Winning Countries 
Ranking 
Event  Host 
Country 
1st 
Round 
2nd 
Round
3rd 
Round
4th 
Round
5th 
Round
Always 
Leading? 
Bid in  
previous 
event? 
Summer Olympic Games        
1984  USA single  candidacy  Yes  No 
1992  Spain  first first first      Yes  No 
1996  USA  second  third first first first  No  No 
2000  Australia second second second first    No  Yes 
2004  Greece  second  first first first    No  Yes 
2008  China  first  first      Yes No 
Winter Olympic Games             
1980  USA single  candidacy  Yes  No 
1988  Canada  first  first      Yes No 
1992  France  second  first first first first  Yes  No 
1994  Norway first  second first     No  Yes 
1998  Japan first first first first    No  No 
2002  USA  first       Yes Yes 
2006  I t a l y   f i r s t        Y e s  N o  
2010  Canada  second  first      Yes No 
World Exhibitions             
1998  Portugal  first       Yes No 
2000  Germany  first       Yes No 
2005  Japan  first       Yes No 
2010  China first first first first    Yes  No 
World Football Cups             
1990  I t a l y   f i r s t        Y e s  No 
1994  U S A   f i r s t        Y e s  No 
1998  France  first       Yes No 
1998  Japan single  candidacy  Yes  No 
  Korea single  candidacy  Yes  No 
2006  Germany first second first     No  No  54
 
Table 3  (ctd.) 
Events analyzed: voting results for the winning and losing countries over the several rounds 
 
PANEL B. Losing Countries 
Ranking 
Event  Losing 
Country 
1st 
Round 
2nd 
Round
3rd 
Round
4th 
Round
5th 
Round
Ever 
Leading?
Bid in  
previous 
event? 
Summer Olympic Games             
1988  Japan  second       no no 
1992  France  first  second second     no  no 
1996  Greece  first first First  second  second yes  no 
2004  Italy  second second second second   no  no 
2008  Canada  second second       no  no 
Winter Olympic Games            
1994  Sweden third  first  second      yes  yes 
1998  USA  fourth  second second second   yes  no 
2002  Switzerland  second       no no 
2006  Switzerland  second       no yes 
2010  Korea  first  second      no no 
World Exhibitions             
1998  Canada  second       no no 
2000  Canada  second       no yes 
2005  Canada  second       no yes 
2010  Korea second  second second second   no  no 
World Football Cups             
2006  South  Africa  second second second     no  no  55
Table 4 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning countries 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows around the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing 
market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] in event time.  1 θ  and 
2 θ  are the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and with crude dependence 
adjustment.  1 τ  is the z-statistic for the sign test. 
a , 
b and 
c  denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.6869 -0.0802 0.7956 -1.1199 0.3492 -0.2030 0.4678 -2.0425 
1 θ   (0.477) (-0.167) (0.828) (-0.389) (0.232) (-0.405) (0.466) (-0.678) 
2 θ   (0.465) 
 
(-0.163) 
 
(0.808) 
 
(-0.379) 
 
(0.228) 
 
(-0.397) 
 
(0.458) 
 
(-0.666) 
 
#  Positive AR  3 3 3 3 2 3 2 2 
1 τ   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.816) (0.000) (-0.816)  (-0.816) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
8 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.1475 
 
-0.2688 
 
-0.2315 
 
0.1392 
 
-0.6561 
 
-0.4788 
 
-0.8302 
 
0.0401 
 
1 θ   (-0.163) (-0.894) (-0.385) (0.077) (-0.573) (-1.255) (-1.088) (0.018) 
2 θ   (-0.150) (-0.821) (-0.353) (0.071) (-0.598) (-1.310) (-1.136) (0.018) 
#  Positive AR  4 2 3 3 4 3 3 3 
1 τ   (0.000) (-1.414) (-0.707) (-0.707) (0.000) (-0.707) (-0.707) (-0.707) 
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PANEL C. World Football Cups 
6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.2937 -0.0248 -0.2027 -0.8063 -0.3328 -0.1635 -0.0706 -0.7306 
1 θ   (-0.239) (-0.060) (-0.247) (-0.328) (-0.243) (-0.358) (-0.077) (-0.267) 
2 θ   (-0.237) (-0.060) (-0.245) (-0.325) (-0.227) (-0.335) (-0.072) (-0.249) 
#  Positive 
AR  3 3 2 2 3 2 4 2 
1 τ   (0.000) (0.000) (-0.816) (-0.816) (0.000) (-0.816) (0.816) (-0.816) 
 
 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
          10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.3847 -0.2258 0.1807 0.3968 0.2104 -0.1793 -0.0356 0.3472 
1 θ   (0.457) (-0.804) (0.322) (0.236) (0.213) (-0.544) (-0.054) (0.176) 
2 θ   (0.396) (-0.697) (0.279) (0.204) (0.190) (-0.485) (-0.048) (0.156) 
#  Positive 
AR  7 4 7 5 5 4 4 6 
1 τ   (1.265) (-0.632) (1.265) (0.000) (0.000) (-0.632) (-0.632) (0.632) 
 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
11 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.6108 -0.2423 -0.4596 -0.3447 -0.4180 -0.1325 -0.3484 -0.4618 
1 θ   (-0.683) (-0.812) (-0.771) (-0.193) (-0.439) (-0.417) (-0.548) (-0.242) 
2 θ   (-0.689) (-0.820) (-0.778) (-0.195) (-0.460) (-0.438) (-0.575) (-0.254) 
#  Positive 
AR  3 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 
1 τ   (-1.508) (-1.508) (-0.905) (-0.905) (-0.302) (-0.905) (-0.302) (-0.905) 
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PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.4678 0.2475 0.6002  0.2300  0.2591  0.2147  0.5925  -0.1793 
1 θ   (0.589) (0.935) (1.134)  (0.145)  (0.307)  (0.762)  (1.052)  (-
0.106) 
2 θ   (0.658) (1.045) (1.267)  (0.162)  (0.351)  (0.872)  (1.203)  (-
0.121) 
#  Positive 
AR  7 7 8  8  6  8  7 7 
1 τ   (1.265) (1.265)  (1.897)
c
(1.897)
c
  (0.632)  (1.897)
c
  (1.265) (1.265) 
 
 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
 [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -0.6067 -0.1695 -0.1401 -0.4299  -0.9455  -0.1988  -0.1968  -0.5455 
1 θ   (-1.114) (-0.933) (-0.386) (-0.395)  (-1.607)  (-1.013)  (-0.502)  (-0.463) 
2 θ   (-0.838) (-0.702) (-0.290) (-0.297)  (-1.106)  (-0.698)  (-0.345)  (-0.319) 
#  Positive 
AR  11 14 16 14  10  14  15  13 
1 τ   (-1.461) (-0.365) (0.365) (-0.365) (-1.826)
c
  (-0.365) (0.000) (-0.730)  58
Table 5  
Industry abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: winning 
countries 
This table reports industry average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date, and day of 
the announcement and next day cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR). # denotes the 
number of markets used to compute the industry average abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are 
constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing market index 
returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] in event time. The table shows the 
abnormal returns for the industries that a priori would benefit more from the event. The last row 
shows the global average AR and CAR across all industries (up to 32). In parentheses we report 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without crude dependence adjustment.
a , 
b and 
c  
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games   
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#5)  0.254 
(0.263) 
1.244 
(0.643) 
0.422 
(0.394) 
2.686 
(1.254) 
Construction (#6)  0.098 
(0.154) 
0.118 
(0.092) 
0.074 
(0.474) 
1.192 
(3.815)
a
 
Leisure and Tourism (#4)  0.377 
(0.819) 
0.146 
(0.159) 
0.112 
(0.191) 
-0.487 
(-0.416) 
Media (#5)  0.217 
(0.323) 
0.484 
(0.360) 
0.083 
(0.107) 
1.521 
(0.980) 
Retail (#3)  -0.08 
(-0.185) 
-0.295 
(-0.341) 
-0.338 
(-0.457) 
-0.692 
(-0.467) 
Communications (#4) 
0.155 
(0.397) 
1.351  
(1.727)
c
 
0.082 
(0.127) 
1.542 
(1.199) 
Transportation (#5)  0.302 
(0.544) 
0.304 
(0.275) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
1.093 
(0.722) 
Global Average   0.0485 
(0.398) 
0.1028 
(0.421) 
-0.1959 
(-1.307) 
0.1117 
(0.373) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#6) 
-0.009 
(-0.019) 
0.409 
(0.439) 
-0.689 
(-1.105) 
-0.797 
(-0.639) 
Construction (#8) 
-0.633 
(-1.284) 
0.895 
(0.908) 
-0.852 
(-1.491) 
0.270 
(0.236)  
Leisure and Tourism (#5) 
0.022 
(0.033) 
-0.310 
(-0.230) 
-0.746 
(-0.911) 
-1.948 
(-1.189) 
Media (#7) 
-1.144 
(-2.410)
b  
-0.580 
(-0.612) 
1.741 
(-2.870)
a
 
-1.764 
(-1.454) 
Retail (#7) 
0.733 
(1.642) 
0.703 
(0.788) 
0.161 
(0.279) 
-0.397 
(-0.344) 
Communications (#6) 
-0.471 
(-1.147) 
-0.395 
(-0.481)  
-0.643 
(-1.113) 
-1.344 
(-1.164) 
Transportation (#7) 
0.127 
(-1.147) 
-0.103 
(0.367) 
-0.215 
(-0.370) 
-0.360 
(-0.309) 
Global Average   0.0634 
(0.631) 
0.0037 
(0.018) 
-0.4394 
(-3.710)
a
 
-1.0037 
(-4.230)
a
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PANEL C. World Football Cups 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#5)  -1.216 
(-1.520) 
-0.272 
(-0.170) 
-1.181 
(-1.371) 
-0.070 
(-0.040) 
Construction (#6)  -0.475 
(-1.309) 
-0.401 
(-0.553) 
-0.588 
(-1.172) 
-0.427 
(-0.425)  
Leisure and Tourism (#5)  0.778 
(0.777) 
0.877 
(0.438) 
0.529 
(0.444) 
1.036 
(0.436) 
Media (#4)  -0.111 
(-0.183)  
-0.479 
(-0.397) 
-0.099 
(-0.129)  
-0.208 
(-0.135) 
Retail (#5) 
0.909 
(1.676)
c
 
1.626 
(1.497) 
0.717 
(1.017) 
1.364 
(0.967) 
Communications (#5)  0.810 
(1.344) 
1.110 
(0.920)  
0.678 
(0.710) 
1.349 
(0.707) 
Transportation (#6)  0.637 
(1.156) 
-0.370 
(-0.336) 
0.573 
(0.908) 
-0.395 
(-0.313) 
Global Average   -0.0549 
(-0.459) 
-0.1528 
(-0.638) 
-0.1099 
(-0.755)  
-0.0309 
(-0.106)  
 
 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#5)  0.491 
(1.019) 
0.061 
(0.064) 
0.314 
(0.602) 
0.038 
(0.037) 
Construction (#6)  0.156 
(0.525) 
0.298 
(0.503) 
0.177 
(0.441) 
0.448 
(0.558)  
Leisure and Tourism (#5)  0.464 
(0.486) 
1.197 
(0.627) 
0.377 
(0.369) 
1.258 
(0.616) 
Media (#4)  0.097 
(0.176)  
0.356 
(0.322) 
-0.168 
(-0.280)  
0.216 
(0.180) 
Retail (#5)  -0.175 
(-0.392)  
-0.262 
(-0.294) 
-0.346 
(-0.654) 
-0.161 
(-0.152) 
Communications (#5)  -0.496 
(-1.163) 
-0.470 
(-0.551)  
-0.717 
(-1.393) 
-0.565 
(-.549) 
Transportation (#6) 
-1.586 
(-1.970)
c
-1.388 
(-0.862) 
-2.056 
(-2.370)
b
 
-1.557 
(-0.897) 
Global Average   0.0278 
(0.221) 
0.1668 
(0.663) 
-0.1395 
(-0.912)  
0.2767 
(0.905)  
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PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#10)  -0.327 
(-0.618) 
-0.400 
(-0.378) 
-0.191 
(-0.344) 
-0.429 
(-0.376) 
Construction (#11)  0.091 
(0.276) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
0.018 
(0.043) 
-0.296 
(-0.348)  
Leisure and Tourism (#6)  0.449 
(0.841) 
0.370 
(0.346) 
0.658 
(1.094) 
0.396 
(0.329) 
Media (#8)  0.607 
(1.307)  
1.312 
(1.412) 
0.867 
(1.638)  
1.411 
(1.333) 
Retail (#8)  0.060 
(0.177)  
0.070 
(0.103) 
-0.039 
(-0.088) 
-0.099 
(-0.113) 
Communications (#7) 
0.709 
(1.739)
c
 
0.641 
(0.785)  
0.733 
(1.467) 
0.748 
(0.749) 
Transportation (#9)  0.194 
(0.512)  
0.704 
(0.931) 
0.099 
(0.203)  
0.215 
(0.221) 
Global Average   0.1345 
(1.633) 
0.0623 
(0.378) 
0.1911 
(1.923)  
0.0177 
(0.089)  
 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#9)  0.516 
(0.969) 
0.665 
(0.624) 
0.749 
(1.231) 
1.037 
(0.853) 
Construction (#10)  0.058 
(0.176) 
0.313 
(0.472) 
0.155 
(0.397) 
0.797 
(1.023)  
Leisure and Tourism (#3)  -0.628 
(-0.713) 
0.385 
(0.218) 
-0.691 
(-0.623) 
1.872 
(0.844) 
Media (#7)  -0.052 
(-0.133)  
-0.567 
(-0.730) 
0.049 
(0.113)  
-0.437 
(-0.510) 
Retail (#9)  -0.509 
(-1.316)  
-0.843 
(-1.090) 
-0.401 
(-0.928) 
-0.420 
(-0.486) 
Communications (#7)  -0.106 
(-0.267)  
-0.793 
(-1.004)  
0.098 
(0.204) 
-0.188 
(-0.196) 
Transportation (#10)  -0.228 
(-0.531)  
0.626 
(0.730) 
-0.041 
(-0.081)  
1.193 
(1.178) 
Global Average   -0.1302 
(-1.217) 
0.0539 
(0.252) 
-0.1054 
(-0.833)  
0.4711 
(1.862)
c
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PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] 
Beverages (#24)  -0.069 
(-0.200) 
0.337 
(0.485) 
-0.173 
(-0.435) 
0.203 
(0.255) 
Construction (#30)  -0.046 
(-0.229) 
0.263 
(0.660) 
-0.257 
(-0.989) 
0.019 
(0.036)  
Leisure and Tourism (#15)  -0.312 
(-0.834) 
-0.168 
(-0.224) 
-0.328 
(-0.746) 
-0.191 
(-0.217) 
Media  (#22) 
0.615 
(1.830)
c  
0.754 
(1.121) 
0.541 
(1.505)  
0.643 
(0.894) 
Retail (#22)  -0.291 
(-1.008)  
0.077 
(0.133) 
-0.259 
(-0.785) 
-0.259 
(-0.785) 
Communications (#18)  0.016 
(0.055)  
0.347 
(0.577)  
-0.139 
(-0.340) 
0.200 
(0.244) 
Transportation (#25)  0.322 
(0.972)  
0.388 
(0.586) 
0.272 
(0.739)  
0.334 
(0.454) 
Global Average   0.0578 
(0.763) 
0.1666 
(1.099) 
-0.0327 
(-0.358)  
0.1061 
(0.581)  
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Table 6 
Abnormal returns at and around the announcement date: losing countries 
This table reports average abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows around the announcement day. Abnormal 
returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were estimated regressing 
market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] in event time.  1 θ  and 
2 θ  are the Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) t-test statistics, without and with crude dependence 
adjustment.  1 τ  is the z-statistic for the sign test. 
a , 
b and 
c  denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
5 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] [-1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] 
CAR (%)  -1.1602  -0.0967 -1.0230 0.5208 2.2832 0.9738 0.1149 -2.4676 
1 θ   (-0.785)  (-0.196) (-1.039) (0.176) (0.996) (1.274) (0.075) (-0.538) 
2 θ   (-0.570)  (-0.143) (-0.754) (0.128) (0.978) (1.251) 0.074) (-0.529) 
#  Positive AR 
2 3 2 3 4 4 2 3 
1 τ   (-0.447) (0.447) (-0.447) (0.447  (1.342 (1.342) (-0.447 (0.447) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
5 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1] [0,0]  [0,1] [0,5]  [-1,1] [0,0]  [0,1] [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.5074 0.2802  -0.0160 0.5253  0.8870 0.6367  0.2619 0.7717 
1 θ   (0.313) (0.518) (-0.015) (0.162)  (0.514) (1.106) (0.227) (0.223) 
2 θ   (0.321) (0.532) (-0.015) (0.166)  (0.518) (1.116) (0.229) (0.225) 
#  Positive AR 
2 3  3 1  2 4  4 2 
1 τ   (-0.447) (0.447) (0.447) (-1.342) (-0.447) (1.342) (1.342) (-0.447)  63
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PANEL C. World Exhibitions 
4  countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1] [0,0] [0,1]  [0,5] [-1,1]  [0,0]  [0,1] [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.4727 0.1898 0.3343  0.9237 0.0798 0.5230  0.0517  0.3347 
1 θ   (0.803) (0.968) (0.852)  (0.785) (0.046) (0.896)  (0.044)  (0.096) 
2 θ   (0.791) (0.953) (0.839)  (0.773) (0.044) (0.866)  (0.043)  (0.092) 
#  Positive AR 
3  3  3 4 2 4 2  3 
1 τ   (1.000) (1.000) (1.000) (2.000)
b   (0.000) (2.000)
b   (0.000) (1.000) 
 
PANEL D. World Football Cups (South Africa) 
         1   c o u n t r y  
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [-1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] [-1,1] [0,0] [0,1] [0,5] 
CAR (%)  0.9040 0.4095 0.6283 0.5535 0.1536 -0.073 -0.493 1.4042 
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Table 7  
Cross-sectional regressions 
This table reports GLS regressions estimates with host country industry cumulative abnormal 
returns CAR[0,1] as the dependent variable. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. SIZE is 
the ratio between the event capital expenditure and the host country GDP; LAG is the time lag 
between the announcement and the moment of the event; LIQ is the ratio between of the country 
market capitalization and GDP; REC is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in recession at the 
time of the event and 0 otherwise; EXP is a dummy that equals 1 if the economy is in expansion at 
the time of the event and 0 otherwise; REP is the weight of the industry market capitalization in 
aggregate market capitalization; VOT is the difference in the percentage of votes between the 
winning and the losing country with the largest number of votes in the last round. D_SOG. 
D_WOG. D_WFC. D_WE and D_EE are the dummies for the type of event (Summer Olympic 
Games, Winter Olympic Games, World Exhibitions and World Specialized Exhibitions). The last 
two rows report, respectively, the number of observations and the adjusted R2. Industry fixed 
effects coefficients are not reported. t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
a ,
b and 
c denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
 
js k k D k j VOT 7 js REP 6 j EXP 5 j REC 4 js LIQ 3 j LAG 2 j SIZE 1 0 js CAR η γ β β β β β β β β + ∑ + + + + + + + + + =     
Independent variables  Coefficients of industry fixed effects 
regression models 
  (1) (2) 
SIZE 
 
LAG 
 
LIQ 
 
REC 
 
EXP 
 
REP 
 
VOT 
 
D_SOG 
 
D_WOG 
 
 D_WFC 
 
D_WE 
-0.0008 
(-0.016) 
-0.0001
a
 
(-2.833) 
-0.0058 
(0.209) 
0.0033 
(0.944) 
-0.0024 
(-1.339) 
0.0373
b
 
(2.082) 
-0.02320
a
 
(-7.956)  
-0.0006 
(-0.132) 
-0.0134
a
 
(-3.138) 
0.0069 
(1.465) 
0.0109
b
 
(2.124)  
0.0230 
(0.475) 
-0.0001
a
 
(-2.795)  
-0.0052 
(-0,190) 
0.0035 
(1.003) 
-0.0022 
(-1.266) 
 
 
-0.0235
a
 
(-8.108)  
-0.0009 
(-0.198) 
-0.0135
a
 
(-3.161)  
0.0068 
(1.440) 
0.0115
b
 
(2.228)  
# obs./ # events 
Adj. R2 
699/32 
19.1% 
701/32 
18.8%  65
Table 8  
Partial Anticipation Model  I - Estimated Parameters  
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-day 
CAR[0,1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. p is 
defined as the probability of country hosting the event and is given by the percentage of votes 
received by the country in the last round of voting; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
country is nominated and 0 otherwise. The table also reports the number of observations and the 
adjusted R2. The last row shows the p-values for linear tests of significance for the parameters. 
Estimates are multiplied by 100. 
a ,
band 
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for bilateral tests. 
 
i i D i p i CAR µ δ φ α + + + =  
 
PANEL A. Unbalanced panel 
 Estimate  t-value 
 
Intercept 
 
p 
 
D 
 
 
0.8598 
 
-3.8013 
 
1.5138 
 
(0.768)  
 
(-1.608) 
 
(1.810)c 
# (winning/losing) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
39 (24/15) 
 
4.1% 
 
Null Hypothesis  p-value (Wald test) 
δ α =   (0.580) 
 
PANEL B. Balanced panel  
 Estimate  t-value 
 
Intercept 
 
p 
 
D 
 
 
-0.9437 
 
0.4791 
 
1.0229 
 
(-0.249) 
 
(0.055) 
 
(0.684) 
 
# (winning/losing) 
Adj. R2 
#28 (14/14) 
0.0% 
Null Hypothesis  p-value (Wald test) 
δ α =   (0.987)  66
Table 9  
Partial Anticipation Model  II - Estimated Parameters  
This table reports OLS regressions of cumulative abnormal returns over the event day and next-day 
CAR[0.1] for winning and losing countries. Abnormal returns are constant-mean adjusted. PS is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are a partial surprise  and 0 otherwise; 
TS is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the announcement news are an almost total surprise and 
0 otherwise; and D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the country is nominated and 0 otherwise. 
The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R2. The last rows show the p-
values for several tests of significance for the sum of parameters. Estimates are multiplied by 100. 
a ,
b and
c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
i i TS i D 2 i PS i D 1 i D 0 i TS 2 i PS 1 0 ω λ λ λ ϕ ϕ ϕ + + + + + + = i CAR  
PANEL A. Unbalanced panel  
 Estimate  t-value 
 
Intercept 
 
PS 
 
TS 
 
D 
 
D*PS 
 
D*TS 
 
 
0.5374 
 
-0.8564 
 
-3.8508 
 
-1.2201 
 
1.0137 
 
8.2827 
 
 
(0.636) 
 
(-0.877) 
     (-3.220)  a  
 
(-1.324) 
 
(0.823) 
     
(5.487)
a
 
# (winning/losing) 
Adj. R2 
39 (24/15) 
46.3% 
Null Hypothesis  p-value (Wald test) 
Intercept+PS=0 
 
Intercept+TS=0 
 
Intercept+PS= Intercept+TS 
 
Intercept+D=0 
 
Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=0 
 
Intercept+TS+D+D*TS=0 
 
Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=Intercept+TS+D+D*TS 
 
|Intercept|=|Intercept+D| 
(0.513) 
 
   (0.000)
a
 
 
   (0.002)
a
 
    
   (0.062)
c  
 
(0.422) 
 
  (0.000)
a
 
 
  (0.000)
a
 
 
(0.185) 
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Table 9 (ctd.) 
Partial Anticipation Model  II - Estimated Parameters  
 
PANEL B. Balanced panel  
 Estimate  t-value 
 
Intercept 
 
PS 
 
TS 
 
D 
 
D*PS 
 
 
D*TS 
 
 
0.5375 
 
-0.7889 
 
-3.8508 
 
-1.1494 
 
1.4165 
 
 
9.3502 
 
 
(0.685) 
 
(-0.857) 
   (-3.468) a  
 
(-1.248) 
 
(1.141) 
   (6.050) a  
# (winning/losing) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
28 (14/14) 
 
60.0% 
 
Null Hypothesis  p-value (Wald test) 
Intercept+PS=0 
 
Intercept+TS=0 
 
Intercept+PS= Intercept+TS 
 
Intercept+D=0 
 
Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=0 
 
Intercept+TS+D+D*TS=0 
 
Intercept+PS+D+D*PS=Intercept+TS+D+D*TS 
 
|Intercept|=|Intercept+D| 
(0.601) 
 
   (0.000)
a
 
 
   (0.001)
a
 
 
(0.203) 
 
(0.982) 
 
   (0.000)
a
 
 
   (0.000)
a 
 
(0.212) 
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Additional Tables 
Table A1 
Announcement Dates 
The table below shows the announcement dates for the mega-events analysed.  
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1960  Italy  (Rome)  16-May-1955 
1964 Japan  (Tokyo) 26-May-1959 
1968  México (Mexico City)  18-Oct-1963 
1972 Germany  (Munich)  26-Apr-1966 
1976 Canada  (Montreal) 13-May-1970 
1980  Soviet Union (Moscow)  23-Oct-1974 
1984  USA (Los Angeles)  18-May -1978 
1988  South Korea (Seoul)  30-Sep-1981 
1992 Spain  (Barcelona)  17-Oct-1986 
1996 USA  (Atlanta)  18-Sept1990 
2000 Australia  (Sydney)  23-Sep-1993 
2004 Greece  (Athens)  05-Sep-1997 
2008 China  (Beijing)  13-July-2001 
Source: International Olympic Committee 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1960 USA  (Squaw  Valley) 14-June-1955 
1964  Austria (Innsbruck)  25-May -1959 
1968 France  (Grenoble) 28-May-1964 
1972 Japan  (Sapporo)  26-Apr-1966 
1976 Austria  (Innsbruck)  04-Feb-1973 
1980 EUA  (Lake  Placid)  23-Oct-1974 
1984 Yugoslavia  (Sarajevo) 18-May-1978 
1988 Canada  (Calgary)  30-Sep-1981 
1992 France  (Albertville)  17-Oct-1986 
1994 Norway  (Lillehammer)  15-Sep-1988 
1998 Japan  (Nagano)  15-Jun-1991 
2002  EUA (Salt Lake City)  16-Jun-1995 
2006 Italy  (Turin)  19-Jun-1999 
2010 Canada  (Vancouver)  02-Jul-2003 
Source: International Olympic Committee 
  69
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1970 México  08-Oct-1964 
1974 Germany  08-Jul-1966 
1978 Argentina  08-Jul-1966 
1982 Spain  08-Jul-1966 
1986 Mexico 20-May  -1983 
1990 Italy  19-May-1984 
1994 USA  4-Jul-1988 
1998 France  2-Jul-1992 
2002  Japan/South Korea  31-May -1996 
2006 Germany  06-Jul-2000 
Source: FIFA. 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1976 Yugoslavia 27-Jan-1976 
1980 Italy 12-Nov-1977 
1984 France 10-Dec-1981 
1988 Germany 14-Mar-1985 
1992 Sweden 16-Dec-1988 
1996 England 05-May-1992 
2000  Belgium / Netherlands  31-Mar -1995 
2004 Portugal 12-Oct-1999 
2008 Austria  /  Switzerland 12-Dec-2002 
Source: UEFA.  70
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL E. World and Specialized Exhibitions 
Event Year  Universal/World 
/Specialized
Host Country  Announcement 
Date 
1970 U  Japan  (Osaka)  14-Set-1965 
1972 S  Netherlands  (Amsterdam)  21-Mar-1968 
1973 S  Germany  (Hamburg)  06-May-1969 
1974 S  Austria  (Vienna)  16-Jun-1969 
1974 U  USA  (Spokane)  16-Feb-1971 
1975 U  Japan  (Okinawa)  24-Mar-1972 
1980 S  Canada  (Montreal) 14-Feb-1979 
1981 S  Bulgaria  (Plovdiv)  06-Jun1980 
1982 S  Netherlands  (Amsterdam)  16-Feb-1979 
1982 U  USA  (Knoxville)  15-Abr-1977 
1983 S  Germany  (Munich)  21-Aug-1979 
1984 S  England  (Liverpool)  09-Feb-1982 
1984  W  USA (New Orleans)  12-Jun-1980 
1985 W  Japan  (Tsukuba)  26-Nov-1980 
1985 W  Bulgaria  (Plovdiv) 30-May-1984 
1986 W  Canada  (Vancouver)  12-Oct-1980 
1988 W  Australia  (Brisbane) 15-Jun-1983 
1990 S  Japan  (Osaka)  26-May-1986 
1992 W  Spain  (Seville)  8-Dec-1982 
1992 S  Italy  (Genoa)  18-Jun-1982 
1992 S  New  Zeland  (Haye-Z.)  25-Nov-1986 
1993 S  Germany  (Stuttgart)  25-May-1989 
1993  W  South Korea (Taejon)  14-Jun-1990 
1998 W  Portugal  (Lisbon)  23-Jun-1992 
1999 S  China  (Kunming)  4-Dec-1994 
2000 W  Germany  (Hanover) 14-Jun-1990 
2002 S  Netherlands  (Haarlemmer)  15-Jun-1995 
2003 S  Germany  (Rostock)  13-Dec-1995 
2005 W  Japan  (Aichi)  12-Jun-1997 
2010 W  China  (Shanghai)  03-Dec-2002 
Source: Bureau International de Expositions (BIE).  71
Table A1 (ctd.) 
Announcement Dates 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
Event Year  Hosting Country  Announcement Date 
1985 Greece  (Athens)  22-Nov-1984 
1986 Italy  (Florence) 
1987 Netherlands  (Amsterdam) 
1988 Germany  (Berlin) 
1989 France  (Paris) 
28-May-1985 
1990 Scotland  (Glasgow)  13-Nov-1986 
1992 Spain  (Madrid) 
1993 France  (Anvers) 
27-May-1988 
1991 Ireland  (Dublin) 
1994 Portugal  (Lisbon) 
1995 Luxemburg  (Luxemburg) 
1996 Denmark  (Copenhagen) 
18-May-1989 
1997 Greece  (Thessaloniki)  18-May-1992 
1998 Sweden  (Stockholm) 
1999 Germany  (Weimar) 
05-Nov-1993 
2000 
France (Avignon); Norway (Bergen); Italy 
(Bologna); Belgium (Brussels); Poland 
(Kracovia); Czech Rep. (Prague); Finland 
(Helsinki); Spain (Santiago 
Compostela);Island (Reykjavik) 
20-Nov-1995 
2001  Netherlands (Rotterdam); Portugal (Porto) 
2002  Belgium (Bruges); Spain (Salamanca) 
2003 Austria  (Graz) 
2004  France (Lille); Italy (Genoa) 
28-May-1998 
2005 Ireland  (Cork)  7-May-2002 
2006  Greece (Patras)  6 –May-2003 
2008 England  (Liverpool)  4-Jun-2003 
Source: EC. 
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Table A2 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
This table reports, for each market, the abnormal returns (AR) at the announcement date and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for several other event windows after the announcement 
day. Abnormal returns are constant-mean and risk-adjusted returns. Model parameters were 
estimated regressing market index returns on the world market index over the period [-120, -20] 
in event time t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
a ,
b and 
c  denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels for bilateral tests. 
PANEL A. Summer Olympic Games 
                         6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
USA 
1984 
-0.463 
(0.247) 
-0.415 
(0.604) 
-1.358 
(0.571) 
-1.000 
(0.128) 
-1.559 
(0.236) 
-2.977 
(0.450) 
SPAIN 
1992 
-0.258 
(0.840) 
-2.019 
(0.431) 
-4.613 
(0.549) 
-0.066 
(0.961) 
-1.699 
(0.533) 
-4.856 
(0.552) 
USA 
1996 
0.790 
(0.230) 
0.767 
(0.559) 
0.207 
(0.958) 
0.242 
(0.768) 
-0.351 
(0.830) 
-2.777 
(0.572) 
    AUSTRALIA 
2000 
0.448 
(0.488) 
1.502 
(0.247) 
1.730 
(0.656) 
0.440 
(0.498) 
1.473 
(0.257) 
1.660 
(0.670) 
GREECE 
2004 
0.114 
(0.944) 
7.758 
(0.019)
b
 
6.367 
(0.519) 
0.216 
(0.896) 
7.856 
(0.019)
b
 
5.765 
(0.563) 
CHINA 
2008 
-1.111 
(0.515) 
-2.819 
(0.409) 
-9.053 
(0.378) 
-1.049 
(0.543) 
-2.194 
(0.399) 
-9.069 
(0.381) 
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Table A2 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns (ctd.) 
 
PANEL B. Winter Olympic Games 
                         8 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean 
Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
USA 
 
1980 
-0.242 
(0.432) 
0.068 
(0.912) 
0.333 
(0.857) 
-2.595 
(0.06)
c
 
-3.353 
(0.226) 
3.810 
(0.645) 
CANADA 
1988 
-0.800 
(0.147) 
0.078 
(0.943) 
0.060 
(0.985) 
-0.704 
(0.270) 
0.238 
(0.852) 
2.344 
(0.542) 
FRANCE 
1992 
-1.005 
(0.473) 
-1.840 
(0.511) 
3.752 
(0.655) 
-1.260 
(0.379) 
-2.598 
(0.364) 
-1.753 
(0.838) 
NORWAY 
1994 
0.124 
(0.919) 
1.812 
(0.456) 
3.307 
(0.650) 
0.250 
(0.839) 
1.919 
(0.437) 
3.034 
(0.682) 
JAPAN 
1998 
-0.238 
(0.772) 
-0.284 
(0.862) 
-1.878 
(0.703) 
0.296 
(0.801) 
-0.309 
(0.895) 
-2.907 
(0.680) 
USA 
2002 
0.388 
(0.385) 
-0.464 
(0.604) 
-1.251 
(0.641) 
0.408 
(0.372) 
-0.548 
(0.549) 
-1.379 
(0.615) 
ITALY 
2006 
0.347 
(0.719) 
-0.669 
(0.728) 
-3.543 
(0.539) 
-0.133 
(0.915) 
-2.023 
(0.414) 
-7.596 
(0.307) 
CANADA 
2008 
-0.723 
(0.060)
c
 
-0.553 
(0.473) 
0.332 
(0.886) 
-0.093 
(0.877) 
0.033 
(0.978) 
1.272 
(0.725)  74
Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
 
PANEL C. World Football Cups 
                         6 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 
1990 
-1.385 
(0.170) 
-1.781 
(0.377) 
-1.603 
(0.791) 
-1.681 
(0.098)
c
 
-2.129 
(0.294) 
-2.381 
(0.695) 
USA 
1994 
1.004 
(0.331) 
0.868 
(0.674) 
-1.396 
(0.822) 
-0.062 
(0.960) 
1.247 
(0.614) 
-0.737 
(0.921) 
FRANCE 
1998 
-0.547 
(0.496) 
-0.144 
(0.929) 
-1.842 
(0.702) 
-0.313 
(0.710) 
0.128 
(0.939) 
-1.807 
(0.721) 
JAPAN 
2000 
0.325 
(0.627) 
-0.556 
(0.677) 
-0.744 
(0.853) 
0.383 
(0.590) 
-0.836 
(0.557) 
-1.251 
(0.770) 
SOUTH KOREA 
2004 
0.691 
(0.546) 
0.522 
(0.820) 
0.716 
(0.917) 
0.745 
(0.525) 
0.237 
(0.920) 
0.189 
(0.979) 
GERMANY 
2008 
-0.237 
(0.849) 
-0.125 
(0.960) 
0.030 
(0.997) 
-0.053 
(0.973) 
0.929 
(0.764) 
1.604 
(0.863) 
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Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL D. European Football Cups 
                         10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 
  1980 
-0.338 
(0.744) 
-0.443 
(0.831) 
-1.062 
(0.864) 
-0.323 
(0.755) 
-0.420 
(0.840) 
-1.008 
(0.871) 
FRANCE 
1984 
-0.325 
(0.814) 
-0.400 
(0.885) 
-1.611 
(0.846) 
-0.419 
(0.763) 
-0.516 
(0.853) 
-1.834 
(0.826) 
GERMANY 
1988 
-0.801 
(0.160) 
0.276 
(0.808) 
0.818 
(0.810) 
-1.081 
(0.071)
c
 
-0.313 
(0.792) 
0.143 
(0.968) 
         SWEDEN 
1992 
1.490 
(0.032)
b
 
1.445 
(0.295) 
2.175 
(0.598) 
1.575 
(0.030)
b
 
1.371 
(0.342) 
1.818 
(0.674) 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1996 
0.290 
(0.672) 
1.161 
(0.397) 
1.953 
(0.635) 
0.305 
(0.674) 
1.543 
(0.289) 
2.977 
(0.495) 
BELGIUM 
2000 
-0.790 
(0.048)
b
 
0.210 
(0.791) 
2.089 
(0.380) 
-0.419 
(0.321) 
0.199 
(0.813) 
2.730 
(0.280) 
NETHERLANDS 
2000 
-1.894 
(0.000)
a
 
-1.366 
(0.154) 
-0.659 
(0.818) 
-1.294 
(0.016)
b
 
-1.368 
(0.197) 
0.408 
(0.898) 
PORTUGAL 
2004 
0.172 
(0.832) 
0.139 
(0.932) 
-0.666 
(0.891) 
0.036 
(0.967) 
-0.545 
(0.752) 
-1.508 
(0.770) 
AUSTRIA 
2008 
0.155 
(0.823) 
0.488 
(0.725) 
1.014 
(0.807) 
0.140 
(0.855) 
0.315 
(0.836) 
0.837 
(0.855) 
SWITZERLAND 
2008 
-0.217 
(0.880) 
0.298 
(0.917) 
-0.084 
(0.992) 
-0.314 
(0.885) 
-0.621 
(0.886) 
-1.091 
(0.933)  76
Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions 
                         11 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
USA 
  1982 
-0.012 
(0.959) 
0.043 
(0.927) 
-1.076 
(0.443) 
0.070 
(0.906) 
-0.341 
(0.775) 
-2.417 
(0.500) 
USA 
1984 
-0.364 
(0.514) 
-0.614 
(0.582) 
-1.097 
(0.743) 
-0.250 
(0.798) 
0.013 
(0.995) 
-1.163 
(0.843) 
JAPAN 
1985 
0.156 
(0.677) 
-0.098 
(0.896) 
-0.558 
(0.804) 
0.147 
(0.698) 
-0.127 
(0.867) 
-0.810 
(0.721) 
         CANADA 
1986 
-1.069 
(0.098)
c
 
-0.485 
(0.706) 
1.389 
(0.719) 
-0.151 
(0.861) 
0.422 
(0.806) 
2.084 
(0.686) 
AUSTRALIA 
1988 
-1.038 
(0.443) 
-2.826 
(0.297) 
-2.560 
(0.752) 
-0.988 
(0.467) 
-2.614 
(0.336) 
-2.179 
(0.789) 
SPAIN 
1992 
-1.644 
(0.040)
b
 
-2.440 
(0.126) 
-2.365 
(0.619) 
-1.610 
(0.044)
b
 
-2.374 
(0.136) 
-2.315 
(0.626) 
SOUTH KOREA 
1993 
-1.311 
(0.505) 
-0.856 
(0.828) 
-3.371 
(0.775) 
-1.245 
(0.530) 
-0.861 
(0.828) 
-3.634 
(0.760) 
PORTUGAL 
1998 
-0.176 
(0.696) 
-0.338 
(0.707) 
-0.193 
(0.943) 
-0.173 
(0.699) 
-0.333 
(0.711) 
-0.178 
(0.947) 
GERMANY 
2000 
-0.238 
(0.803) 
0.040 
(0.983) 
2.882 
(0.615) 
-0.116 
(0.909) 
0.107 
(0.958) 
2.761 
(0.650) 
JAPAN 
2005 
1.114 
(0.314) 
1.415 
(0.522) 
1.505 
(0.820) 
1.131 
(0.310) 
1.448 
(0.515) 
1.567 
(0.814) 
CHINA 
2010 
1.917 
(0.076)
c
 
1.104 
(0.607) 
1.650 
(0.798) 
1.728 
(0.118) 
0.828 
(0.706) 
1.205 
(0.855) 
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Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions 
                         10 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
         CANADA 
  1980 
0.311 
(0.618) 
0.097 
(0.938) 
0.796 
(0.831) 
0.230 
(0.736) 
-0.010 
(0.994) 
0.782 
(0.848) 
NETHERLANDS 
1982 
0.185 
(0.812) 
0.205 
(0.895) 
0.173 
(0.970) 
0.161 
(0.838) 
0.170 
(0.914) 
0.258 
(0.957) 
GERMANY 
1983 
0.232 
(0.651) 
0.137 
(0.893) 
0.447 
(0.885) 
0.191 
(0.713) 
0.087 
(0.933) 
0.428 
(0.891) 
UNITED        
KINGDOM 
1984 
-0.135 
(0.892) 
0.788 
(0.692) 
0.287 
(0.962) 
-0.950 
(0.444) 
0.507 
(0.838) 
-1.339 
(0.857) 
JAPAN 
1990 
-0.052 
(0.932) 
0.131 
(0.914) 
1.305 
(0.721) 
0.237 
(0.747) 
0.515 
(0.727) 
0.647 
(0.884) 
ITALY 
1992 
0.811 
(0.461) 
3.257 
(0.140) 
1.621 
(0.806) 
0.641 
(0.568) 
2.884 
(0.201) 
1.876 
(0.781) 
GERMANY 
1993 
0.371 
(0.564) 
0.779 
(0.545) 
3.595 
(0.353) 
0.363 
(0.577) 
0.660 
(0.612) 
2.869 
(0.463) 
CHINA 
1999 
0.840 
(0.563) 
0.904 
(0.756) 
-5.034 
(0.564) 
1.332 
(0.372) 
1.317 
(0.659) 
-6.256 
(0.485) 
NETHERLANDS 
2002 
0.299 
(0.500) 
-0.124 
(0.889) 
0.010 
(0.997) 
0.299 
(0.500) 
-0.116 
(0.896) 
0.060 
(0.982) 
GERMANY 
2003 
-0.388 
(0.544) 
-0.172 
(0.893) 
-0.900 
(0.814) 
-0.356 
(0.587) 
-0.088 
(0.946) 
-1.118 
(0.776)  78
Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns  
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture 
                         30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 
  1986 
-0.526 
(0.603) 
0.058 
(0.977) 
-3.763 
(0.535) 
-0.583 
(0.568) 
0.057 
(0.978) 
-3.535 
(0.564) 
NETHERLANDS 
1987 
0.922 
(0.223) 
0.101 
(0.946) 
-0.356 
(0.937) 
0.904 
(0.233) 
0.104 
(0.945) 
-0.270 
(0.952) 
GERMANY 
1988 
-0.183 
(0.754) 
0.371 
(0.752) 
2.027 
(0.564) 
-0.228 
(0.702) 
0.380 
(0.751) 
2.256 
(0.529) 
FRANCE 
1989 
0.658 
(0.330) 
1.254 
(0.354) 
0.860 
(0.832) 
0.657 
(0.332) 
1.257 
(0.353) 
0.884 
(0.827) 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
1990 
0.275 
(0.703) 
0.277 
(0.847) 
0.812 
(0.851) 
-0.737 
(0.353) 
-0.818 
(0.606) 
-2.708 
(0.569) 
IRELAND 
1991 
0.303 
(0.710) 
-0.517 
(0.752) 
-2.127 
(0.664) 
0.382 
(0.642) 
-0.665 
(0.686) 
-2.162 
(0.661) 
SPAIN 
1992 
1.133 
(0.320) 
1.627 
(0.475) 
7.684 
(0.262) 
0.383 
(0.749) 
0.384 
(0.873) 
6.660 
(0.355) 
FRANCE 
1993 
1.669 
(0.241) 
2.902 
(0.308) 
4.329 
(0.612) 
1.131 
(0.441) 
2.081 
(0.479) 
4.535 
(0.607) 
DENMARK 
1996 
-0.151 
(0.872) 
0.899 
(0.632) 
-1.266 
(0.822) 
-0.533 
(0.571) 
-0.167 
(0.929) 
-4.060 
(0.472) 
GREECE 
1997 
-1.142 
(0.321) 
-0.964 
(0.675) 
-4.383 
(0.525) 
-1.190 
(0.302) 
-1.034 
(0.653) 
-4.436 
(0.520) 
SWEDEN 
1998 
-2.340 
(0.016)
b
 
-2.866 
(0.138) 
-4.328 
(0.453) 
-2.531 
(0.011)
b
 
-3.087 
(0.114) 
-4.363 
(0.455) 
GERMANY 
1999 
-1.898 
(0.004)
a
 
-2.104 
(0.101) 
-2.370 
(0.537) 
-2.020 
(0.002)
a
 
-2.245 
(0.084)
c
 
-2.398 
(0.536) 
BELGIAN 
2000 
0.911 
(0.019)
b
 
0.729 
(0.344) 
1.088 
(0.637) 
0.950 
(0.016)
b
 
0.797 
(0.306) 
1.185 
(0.611) 
SPAIN 
2000 
0.816 
(0.219) 
1.064 
(0.423) 
4.168 
(0.296) 
0.905 
(0.180) 
1.220 
(0.366) 
4.422 
(0.275) 
FINLAND 
2000 
1.526 
(0.302) 
0.544 
(0.854) 
1.365 
(0.877) 
1.776 
(0.239) 
0.989 
(0.742) 
2.173 
(0.810) 
FRANCE 
2000 
-0.400 
(0.620) 
-0.929 
(0.564) 
0.022 
(0.996) 
-0.326 
(0.689) 
-0.801 
(0.622) 
0.216 
(0.965)  79
Table A2 (ctd.) 
Individual Market Abnormal Returns 
PANEL G. European Capitals of Culture (cont.) 
                         30 countries 
  Market Model  Constant-Mean Model 
  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5]  [0,0]  [0,1]  [0,5] 
ITALY 
2000 
-0.123 
(0.894) 
-0.360 
(0.845) 
-0.727 
(0.896) 
-0.045 
(0.962) 
-0.223 
(0.904) 
-0.506 
(0.928) 
NORWAY 
2000 
0.716 
(0.271) 
1.555 
(0.232) 
3.100 
(0.427) 
0.764 
(0.243) 
1.639 
(0.210) 
3.245 
(0.407) 
POLAND 
2000 
-3.457 
(0.461) 
-3.836 
(0.140) 
-3.234 
(0.806) 
-3.452 
(0.568) 
-3.831 
(0.201) 
-3.268 
(0.781) 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
2000 
-1.594 
(0.001)
a
 
-1.880 
(0.057)
c
 
-4.208 
(0.173) 
-1.433 
(0.004)
a
 
-1.557 
(0.114) 
-3.058 
(0.300) 
NETHERLANDS 
2001 
-0.946 
(0.200) 
0.082 
(0.956) 
-1.056 
(0.811) 
-0.898 
(0.440) 
-0.181 
(0.938) 
-1.779 
(0.799) 
PORTUGAL 
2001 
0.155 
(0.883) 
-0.942 
(0.654) 
-7.473 
(0.237) 
0.179 
(0.884) 
-1.152 
(0.641) 
-8.056 
(0.277) 
BELGIAN 
2002 
0.713 
(0.263) 
1.547 
(0.224) 
1.883 
(0.621) 
0.727 
(0.380) 
1.364 
(0.410) 
1.371 
(0.782) 
SPAIN 
2002 
0.154 
(0.874) 
-0.278 
(0.886) 
0.665 
(0.909) 
0.169 
(0.890) 
-0.542 
(0.823) 
-1.406 
(0.847) 
AUSTRIA 
2003 
-0.034 
(0.965) 
-0.204 
(0.895) 
-1.050 
(0.821) 
-0.014 
(0.988) 
-0.341 
(0.848) 
-1.429 
(0.790) 
FRANCE 
2004 
-0.222 
(0.762) 
0.426 
(0.771) 
1.625 
(0.712) 
-0.212 
(0.832) 
0.174 
(0.931) 
0.919 
(0.878) 
ITALY 
2004 
-0.938 
(0.476) 
-1.279 
(0.627) 
-2.348 
(0.766) 
-0.926 
(0.541) 
-1.554 
(0.608) 
-3.120 
(0.731) 
IRELAND 
2005 
-0.603 
(0.603) 
-0.814 
(0.725) 
0.664 
(0.924) 
-1.032 
(0.408) 
0.039 
(0.987) 
1.596 
(0.831) 
GREECE 
2006 
0.362 
(0.500) 
1.336 
(0.889) 
-1.496 
(0.997) 
0.969 
(0.500) 
1.808 
(0.896) 
-0.481 
(0.982) 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
2008 
-0.842 
(0.407) 
-2.002 
(0.324) 
-1.853 
(0.761) 
0.296 
(0.844) 
0.001 
(0.999) 
1.208 
(0.894)  80
Table A3 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows descriptive statistics of the events. SIZE is the ratio between the event capital 
expenditure and the host country GDP; LAG is the time lag between the announcement and 
the moment of the event (number of months); VOT is the difference in the percentage of votes 
between the winning and the losing country with the largest number of votes in the last round. 
# denotes the number of events used to computed the cross-sectional statistics. 
PANEL A. All events (#32)   
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE   0.0124 0.0017  0.0000 0.1056  0.0245 
LAG   68.7 70.5  13  120  23.1 
VOT  56.3% 38.7%  2.3% 100.0%  42.1% 
PANEL B. Summer Olympic Games (#6)           
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0326 0.0170  0.0005 0.1056  0.0021 
LAG     77.5 78.5  69.0 85.0  7.3 
VOT     32.7% 27.5%  2.3%  88.2%  29.3% 
PANEL C. Winter Olympic Games (#8) 
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0110 0.0024  0.0001 0.0725  0.0022 
LAG     69.1 70.5  64.0 77.0  4.5 
VOT     28.8% 20.3%  2.8% 100.0%  32.1% 
PANEL D. World Football Cups (#5)* 
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
VOT   34.7% 26.3%  4.3% 100.0%  39.1% 
*only 1 included in the cross-sectional regressions and used to compute the statistics in PANEL A. 
PANEL E. World Exhibitions (#10) 
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE  (#1)  0.0102 0.0014  0.0000 0.0475  0.0023 
LAG (#1)     76.2 69.0  38.0  124.0  29.6 
VOT (#6)    66.9% 100.0%  2.5%  100.0%  43.4% 
PANEL F. Specialized Exhibitions (#7) 
  Mean Median  Minimum  Maximum  SD 
SIZE    0.0010 0.0003  0.0000 0.0057  0.0021 
LAG   49.3 47.0  13.0 88.0  27.7 
VOT  100.0% 100.0%  100.0% 100.0%  0.0% 
 